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Introduction 
  Like a stern parent, tort law has little patience for excuses.1 It instructs us to 
refrain from attacking others even when we are provoked or under duress.  It 
requires us to avoid trespassing on or converting others’ property even out of 
necessity.  It insists that we be careful even in the face of pressures that would 
induce carelessness in a cautious and resilient person.  And excuses carry little or no 
weight when it comes to determining the compensation that tortfeasors owe their 
victims.  
  On these dimensions, criminal law is more forgiving. It recognizes nominate 
excuses such as duress and provocation, as well as an array of innominate excuses 
that temper punishment. The same is true of ordinary morality—we tend to react 
less sharply to wrongs attended by an explanation that renders their commission 
more comprehensible.2 No less than criminal law and morality, tort law seems 
concerned with holding persons answerable for their wrongs, and excuses seem to go 
hand-in-hand with answerability of this sort.  So why, or in what sense, are torts 
inexcusable wrongs? 
  One way to answer this question is to avoid it. If, for example, tort law is 
understood as a scheme to incentivize the adoption of cost-efficient precautions 
against injury, rather than as law that stands ready to hold wrongdoers answerable 
to their victims, its inattention to excuses might be unproblematic. The same could 
be said if tort law is seen as a mechanism for fairly allocating losses: at least as 
between an innocent victim and a wrongful injurer, the argument might go, fairness 
demands that the loss be borne by the injurer, even an injurer who has an excuse. 
Tort law’s nonrecognition of excuses might even be cited as evidence favoring the 
interpretive accuracy of one of these conceptions of tort.  
  The aim of this Article, by contrast, is to answer the question head-on—to 
explain how tort law, understood as law that enables victims to hold wrongdoers 
answerable, cogently can refuse to recognize excuses.3 The point is not that tort law 
would be incoherent or grossly dysfunctional if it were to recognize certain excuses.4  
Torts are not inexcusable in this strong sense. Rather, it is that the courts’ 
longstanding disinclination to recognize excuses in this domain is entirely 
defensible.5    
                                                      
1 JAMES GOUDKAMP, TORT LAW DEFENCES 82-83 (2013) (arguing that Anglo-American tort 
doctrine does not recognize excuses defeating liability, and citing other scholars who make 
the same claim).   
2 Gary Watson, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian 
Theme, in AGENCY AND ANSWERABILITY 219, 239-46 (2004) (observing that excuses can 
mitigate the harshness with which even heinous misdeeds are judged). 
3 I will suggest that contract law is like tort law in being unreceptive to excuses. See infra 
text accompany notes 130-134.  
4 Compare Bruce Chapman, A Theory of Criminal Law Excuses, 1 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 75, 
86 (1988) (asserting that tort law has no conceptual space for excuses).   
5 Duress, provocation, and other nominate excuses are defined narrowly in criminal law 
and probably are invoked successfully only on rare occasions. An investigation of excuses 
might thus seem to promise to locate only a trivial difference between tort and other 
departments of law. However, as noted, excuses often are the stuff of criminal sentencing, 
and in that sense are hardly esoteric. Regardless, this imagined objection merely expresses 
an ex ante doubt about the fruitfulness of the proposed inquiry. The proof will have to be in 
the pudding.      3 
 
  The inexcusability of torts, I will ultimately suggest, teaches us something 
important about what it means for law to identify conduct as wrongful.  It is often 
supposed that talk of torts and crimes as “legal wrongs” is either vacuous (a tort or 
crime is a wrong only in that the law declares it so) or reflective of an excessively 
moralistic and judgmental understanding of what it means to commit a tort or 
crime. Neither of these perspectives accurately captures the sense in which torts are 
wrongs. They are not wrongs in name only, nor are they typically heinous misdeeds.   
  The title of this article thus strikes an ironic chord. The phrase “inexcusable 
wrongs” calls to mind acts so awful as to be unforgivable. Yet torts are often 
mundane, so their inexcusability cannot stem from their being beyond the pale. The 
absence of tort excuses instead connects to other features that mark torts as a 
distinctive kind of wrong. As I will explain, it is precisely because tort law is 
concerned to identify relational, injurious wrongs, and to enable victims of such 
wrongs to demand responsive conduct from those who have wrongfully injured them, 
that the courts are justified in defining them as inexcusable wrongs.  
  Part I discusses the nature of excuses, distinguishing them from other kinds of 
responses to allegations of wrongdoing. Part II defends the doctrinal claim that tort 
law does not recognize excuses, while also placing that claim in perspective.  Part III 
argues that the distinctiveness of tort notions of wrongdoing and responsibility can 
satisfactorily account for why tort law, in contrast to criminal law, fails to credit 
excuses. It also briefly discusses excuses in contract law.  
 
I. Excuses 
  In ordinary discourse, the term “excuse” and its cognates refer to any of various 
ways in which a person might attempt to defuse or mitigate an allegation of 
wrongdoing.6 The legal concept of an excuse, which has been developed most fully in 
criminal law, has a somewhat more precise meaning. To appreciate what it means 
for tort law to fail to recognize excuses, it is thus necessary to attend to distinctions 
among different kinds of response to allegations of misconduct.  In particular, it is 
important to distinguish excuses from denials, claims of general incapacity, and 
justifications.7   
  
A. Ways of Responding to Allegations of Wrongdoing 
  As its name indicates, a denial maintains that an actor has not committed the 
wrong(s) she is alleged to have committed. Suppose a defendant is charged with 
murder as defined by the Model Penal Code, and answers by asserting that her 
killing of the victim was not purposeful, knowing, or reckless. This response denies 
                                                      
6 Austin’s influential address, “A Plea for Excuses,” uses the concept of excuse in the 
broad sense just described.  J. L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 1 (1957).  
7 This taxonomy generally follows the taxonomy developed by Paul Robinson and recently 
applied to tort law by James Goudkamp. See Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A 
Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUMBIA L. REV. 199 (1982); GOUDKAMP, supra note 1, at 82 n. 42 
(listing various taxonomies). This list is not exhaustive.  Liability or punishment can also be 
defeated by defenses grounded in considerations that do not pertain to the defendant’s 
responsibility for having done wrong—for example, a policy-based immunity defense or 
limitations-period defense.      4 
 
having committed the charged offense.8  Likewise, a tort defendant who is sued for 
battery and who argues that he acted without any intent to touch another person 
denies having committed that tort.9  A valid denial obviates the need for any further 
plea: there is nothing that needs justifying or excusing given the definition of the 
legal wrong that one is alleged to have committed. 
  A claim of general incapacity is an effort to establish that the alleged wrongdoer 
is not an appropriate candidate for legal accountability. To the extent that infancy 
precludes punishment or liability, it constitutes a general incapacity defense.10 So, 
too, do certain claims of serious mental disability—for example, an assertion that a 
criminal defendant is so delusional as to have been unable to appreciate the nature 
or significance of his actions.11 Although a plea of general incapacity will often 
contain the seeds of a denial or an excuse, it goes further in maintaining that the 
actor is simply not a suitable candidate for responsibility.12  
  In contrast to denials and claims of incapacity, pleas of justification and excuse 
assume or concede that one’s conduct meets the definition of a specified wrong, and 
that one is eligible to be held responsible for one’s wrongs. If, in response to a charge 
of murder, the competent, adult defendant offers a justification or excuse, she 
concedes having caused the death of another with the requisite mens rea. Yet she 
maintains that some further feature of the situation in which she acted warrants a 
less negative assessment of her action than the assessment that would apply were 
she to have committed the wrong without a justification or excuse.  
  To plead a justification is to claim that one’s conduct was permissible, all things 
considered even though it meets the definition of a wrong.  For example, in both tort 
and criminal law, the self-defense privilege permits a person to strike another as a 
proportionate response to an imminent threat of bodily harm posed by that other. In 
such a case, conduct that is in the first instance proscribed—that meets the 
definition of criminal assault or tortious battery—is deemed permissible once the 
full circumstances are taken into account.13  
                                                      
8 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1962) (defining murder to require a purposeful, knowing, 
or reckless killing of another).  Of course an accidental killing might constitute a different 
crime, such as negligent homicide, and an answer insisting that the victim’s death was an 
accident would be nonresponsive, or not fully responsive, to that charge. This is just to 
observe that excuses, like denials and justifications, are always relative to the allegations to 
which they respond.  
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965) (defining battery to require an intentional 
or knowing touching of another). 
10 4 WILLIAM  BLACKSTONE,  COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND * 22 (1765-69) 
(“Infants, under the age of discretion, ought not to be punished by any criminal prosecution 
whatever.”). In U.S. criminal law, the common law defense of infancy has largely been 
displaced by the use of juvenile courts.  Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New 
Juvenile Court, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 503, 512-13 (1984). 
11 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962) (defining instances in which mental disease or defect 
excludes criminal responsibility). 
12 G OUDKAMP, supra note 1, at 85 (treating pleas of insanity and infancy as standing 
apart from excuses).  
13 There is a scholarly debate as to whether a justification renders the relevant conduct 
not only permissible but something that ought to be done. Marcia Baron, Justifications and 
Excuses, 2 OH. ST. J. CRIM. LAW 387, 396 (2005) (noting the debate). I am inclined to think 
that some justified conduct is merely permissible. For example, suppose Dave knows that his 
friend Paul is going through a very difficult time, and that he (Dave) has just given Paul 5 
 
  Unlike a justification, an excuse concedes that the actor’s conduct not only meets 
the definition of the alleged wrong, but also that the conduct was wrongful when all 
things are considered.14 When a wrongdoer offers an excuse, she typically attempts 
to explain her misconduct as the result of her having been defeated, overcome, or 
misled by a certain kind of force or influence, or of having been otherwise pushed 
into wrongful conduct by a feature of the particular circumstances in which she 
acted.15  The word’s Latin root, ex-causa, helps convey the idea.16  A person who 
offers an excuse points to some ‘cause’ that distracted her, misled her, clouded her 
                                                                                                                                                                           
some advice that is very hard for Paul to accept. Dave perceives that Paul is very angry at 
Dave, and indeed is about to spit on him. In this situation, it might be right for Dave to 
endure the indignity of being spat upon by Paul, even though Dave is surely permitted to 
take certain steps (e.g., lightly pushing Paul) to avoid being spat upon. 
 In theory, one could perhaps eliminate the category of justifications (and the category of 
excuses) by treating each justification (and excuse) as a further specification of the 
underlying wrong.  On this view, for example, a definition of criminal assault would take the 
following form: “An attempt to cause, or a purposeful, knowing, or reckless causing of, bodily 
injury to another, not done in the reasonable belief that the other posed a threat of imminent 
death or serious bodily harm to the actor or others, not done as lawfully administered 
punishment, not done under duress, etc….”  Yet insofar as criminal and tort law aims, and 
ought to aim, to generate guidance rules, there is surely something to be said for defining 
crimes and torts by reference to relatively clean paradigm cases, without the litany of 
qualifications that would be required were justifications and excuses incorporated into their 
definitions.  Moreover, as John Gardner has argued, there is probably value in having a 
system that defines wrongs in such a way that there is a burden on those who commit them 
to come forward with an account that justifies (or excuses) them.  JOHN GARDNER, OFFENCES 
AND DEFENCES: SELECTED ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 77-89 (2007). 
14 GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.3.4, at 811 (1978) (excuses “do not 
constitute exceptions or modifications of the norm [of conduct that has been allegedly 
violated], but rather a judgment in the particular case that an individual cannot be fairly 
held accountable for violating the norm”).  As indicated below, I would modify Fletcher’s 
formulation in various ways.    
Because excused wrongs are still wrongs, excused wrongdoers can cogently be held 
accountable in ways that justified (putative) wrongdoers are not. See Robinson, supra note 7, 
at 278-91 (noting distinct collateral consequences in criminal law that follow from an action’s 
being excused rather than justified, including differences in the application of rules of 
accomplice liability). 
15 Both justified and excused conduct can generate regret, although the nature of the 
regret each generates is distinct. One who justifiably kills in self-defense might sincerely 
regret having taken a life. Likewise, a justified action might be one from which the actor 
seeks to distance himself.  Still, in a case of justification, any regret or effort at disassociation 
would concern the existence of the circumstances that necessitated the justified action.  In a 
case of excuse, there is an additional basis for regret over one’s having acted less well than 
one ought to have acted. 
16 Definition of excuse, v., Oxford English Dictionary, www.OED.com. So too does the root 
of the word “succumbed,” which suggest the idea of a person being placed under the influence 
or control of some other person or force. Within a discussion of responsibility that does not 
attempt to isolate the distinctiveness of excuses, Bernard Williams suggested that the 
concept of an excused wrong can be found in ancient Greek literature. See Bernard 
WILLIAMS, SHAME AND NECESSITY 52-54 (1993) (discussing an episode in The Iliad in which 
Agamemnon attempts to explain his mistreatment of Achilles to Achilles as the product of 
divinely-imposed madness, which explanation is offered not to absolve Agamemnon but to 
render his wrong more understandable).  6 
 
judgment, weakened her resolve, or otherwise made it too difficult for her to refrain 
from doing what she ought not to have done.  By pointing to these sorts of 
impediments, an excuse renders the commission of a wrong more understandable 
and thereby generates a claim to leniency or forgiveness that is unavailable to actors 
who lack an excuse.17  
  
B.  More on Excuses 
  While excuses involve an explanation of wrongdoing in terms of a succumbing or 
failing, not just any succumbing or failing will suffice. Suppose a motorcyclist 
abruptly cuts in front of a car, enraging the car’s driver, as a result of which the 
driver deliberately slams his car into the back of the motorcycle.  While the car 
driver can point to his hair-trigger temper as an explanation for his behavior, it is 
not an explanation that renders his wrong understandable in the requisite sense, 
and hence it is not one that can serve as an excuse.18 Excuses are normative.19 An 
effort at an excuse will be credible only if it offers an explanation of a wrong that 
renders it understandable in light of norms as to how persons are supposed to 
handle situations in which it is more difficult than usual to do the right thing. 
  The norms that determine what counts as a more understandable wrong vary 
with context. Some are more subjective, some more objective; some are more 
forgiving, some strict. Criminal law famously defines its nominate excuses against 
                                                      
17 See FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 10.3.2, at 804 (determining when an excuse will lie in 
criminal law is “patently a matter of moral judgment about what we expect people to be able 
to resist in trying situations”); see also Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: 
Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its Proper Limits, 26 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1334 
(1989) (“duress is a normative defense: the actor should be excused only if he attained or 
reflected society’s legitimate expectations of moral strength”); Erin Kelly, What is an 
Excuse?, in BLAME: ITS NATURE AND NORMS (D. JUSTIN COATES & NEAL A. TOGNAZZINI EDS., 
2013) (“Circumstances surrounding an agent’s disregard for morality sometimes challenge 
the appropriateness of ordinary moral expectations by unsettling the ordinary 
presuppositions of our expectations.  This is the case if the obstacles seem too much 
reasonably to require the agent to bear without experiencing inner conflict, ambivalence, 
indifference, or stress that might lead her morally to fail to act well.”). Focusing on criminal 
law, John Gardner argues that an excuse involves a claim by an actor to have had reasonable 
grounds for holding the beliefs or harboring the feelings that prompted his wrongful action.  
On his account, for example, a criminal defendant claiming provocation is claiming to have 
been justified in being provoked, though not justified in acting on that provocation by killing 
another.  GARDNER, supra note 13, at 86, 133-34, 257-58, 269.        
18 In this example, the wrongdoer’s malicious disposition toward the victim helps render 
any claim to an excuse particularly inapt. I do not thereby mean to endorse the distinct claim 
that excuses are recognized only when circumstances demonstrate that the wrongdoer’s 
wrong was not animated by disrespect.  See Peter Westen, An Attitudinal Theory of Excuse, 
25 LAW & PHIL. 289, 373 (2006) (arguing that excused crimes are crimes for which one cannot 
attribute to the criminal an attitude of disregard for the interests protected by the relevant 
criminal prohibition).  One who commits a provoked assault might act with disdain for the 
protected interests of the victim, yet still may be able to claim provocation as a partial 
excuse.     
19 Gardner, supra note 13, at 124.  In my view, excuses are not only normative, but 
conduct-guiding.  See infra text accompany notes  -   (critiquing the claim that excuses are 
not conduct-guiding).     7 
 
relatively demanding and objective criteria.20 A criminal assault defendant claiming 
duress, for example, must demonstrate that he committed the assault under a threat 
that would “induce ‘such a fear as a [person] of ordinary fortitude and courage might 
justly yield to.’”21 They are so defined in part because these excuses—unlike excuses 
recognized at sentencing—have the dramatic effect of sparing the defendant from 
being held accountable for the crime she has committed, and in part to limit their 
availability to instances in which it is especially plausible to believe that the actor 
succumbed in the right way. Suppose D kills innocent victim V only because third-
party T had threatened imminent harm to D’s child unless D kills V.  The situation 
in which T placed D provides D with a powerful explanation of why he intentionally 
visited harm on an innocent bystander, even though the killing was still D’s doing, 
and even supposing that D’s killing of V was wrongful.  
  Because excuses concern instances in which there is a complication in the 
linkage between one’s actions and one’s agency, the history of the circumstances 
being invoked as grounds for an excuse will tend to matter. If an agent can fairly be 
held responsible for creating those circumstances, he often will not be able to invoke 
them as an excuse.22 This much is evidenced in criminal law’s opposing treatment of 
involuntary and voluntary intoxication. If a person commits a crime because his 
judgment or inhibitions were impaired after he was secretly drugged by another, he 
may be able to claim an excuse.  The same is not true if he gets himself intoxicated.23  
  J. L. Austin famously suggested that excuses tend to provide only partial 
exoneration.24  It is clear, however, that in law at least, some excuses operate to 
spare an actor entirely from any adverse legal consequences. For example, a 
successful duress argument defeats a criminal prosecution for assault. Nor is there 
anything conceptually or morally odd about being fully excused in this sense—just 
as there is nothing odd about a crime being pardoned.25 A fully excused legal wrong 
                                                      
20 ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 164 (1999) (discussing the 
objectivity of the norms contained within excuses recognized in criminal law). 
21 State v. Toscano, 378 A.2d 755, 761 (N.J. 1977) (quoting United States v. Haskell, 26 
Fed. Cas. 207 (Pa. Cir. Ct. 1823)).   
22 See generally Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One’s Own Defense: A Study 
in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. 1 (1985) (surveying the 
law’s treatment of various scenarios in which a defendant helps to create conditions that he 
later invokes as grounds for a defense to a criminal prosecution). 
23 See Model Penal Code § 2.08 (1962). 
24 Austin, supra note 6, at 3 (“few excuses get us out of it completely: the average excuse, 
in a poor situation, gets us only out of the fire into the frying pan—but still, of course, any 
frying pan in a fire.”).    
25 If, as I contend, excuses such as duress render the commission of a crime more 
understandable, as opposed to defeating the allegation of criminal wrongdoing, one might 
fairly ask why, or on what grounds, a court can enter a judgment of “not guilty” with respect 
to a defendant who establishes such an excuse.  Shouldn’t the practice instead be to enter a 
judgment of “guilty” and then release the defendant without punishment?  By declaring a 
defendant whose criminal act is excused “not guilty,” does the court arrogate for itself a 
power to pardon?   
As to the last question, concerning judicial authority, the short answer is that 
legislatures, by recognizing excuses in criminal codes, have conferred the requisite authority 
on the courts. As to the form of judgments entered in cases of fully excused criminal conduct, 
it is important to remember that a judgment of “not guilty” does not necessarily entail that 
the defendant did not commit the alleged crime.  A judgment of “not guilty by reason of 8 
 
is still a wrong. It is simply a wrong for which one is not held legally answerable or 
accountable.26   
  With respect to judgments about the acceptability of an actor’s conduct, denials 
and justifications enjoy a certain priority over excuses. It is better not to commit a 
wrong than to commit a wrong under circumstances that render its commission 
understandable.27 Nonetheless, it is common for alleged wrongdoers simultaneously 
to assert a denial, a justification and an excuse, and the same facts marshaled to 
support the denial or justification often will also be invoked in aid of establishing the 
excuse. For example, a claim that one’s act was the lesser of two evils, and therefore 
justified, might rest on facts that also tend to demonstrate that the act was in 
response to a kind of compulsion that should count as duress.   
  To distinguish between excuses, on the one hand, and denials, claims of general 
incapacity, and justifications, on the other, is not to take a position on whether a 
particular responsive plea belongs in one category or another. In criminal law, for 
example, there is a longstanding debate about whether self-defense based on an 
actor’s reasonable but mistaken belief that the victim was about to harm him should 
be treated as a justification or an excuse.28 It is also possible that the same word—
“necessity” or “duress” for instance—might, depending on the facts, refer to a 
justification and an excuse.29  A person who intentionally kicks his victim in the shin 
in order to save his child from imminent death at the hands of a third-party 
probably has a claim not merely to the excuse of duress, but to the justification of 
necessity.  
  Finally, because a wide array of conditions might generate plausible claims of 
excuse, legislatures and courts obviously face choices about whether and how  to 
recognize particular excuses.30 As noted, Anglo-American criminal law seems 
generally inclined to recognize formally only a handful of relatively clear-cut excuse-
based defenses concerning discrete conditions affecting a defendant’s actions at the 
time of acting. It does not recognize as nominate excuses diffuse background 
conditions that might render certain wrongful conduct understandable. Thus, 
“duress” is the name for an excuse that spares a criminal wrongdoer from being held 
legally accountable whereas “narcotics addiction” and “severely abusive childhood” 
are not, even though they could conceivably count as the kinds of influence that 
render an actor’s wrong understandable. However, when it comes to the sentencing 
                                                                                                                                                                           
insanity,” for example, conveys that the defendant committed the alleged offense but also 
that there are reasons to deem him not guilty of—that is, not to be held responsible for—the 
offense.  Thanks to James Edelman and John Gardner for raising these issues and informing 
my thinking about them. 
26 This observation may be consistent with J. L. Austin’s, in that a legal wrong’s being 
fully excused does not mean that the wrong is in all respects excused.  For example, a person 
who assaults under duress perhaps might still be subject to legitimate criticism.   
27 Baron, supra note 13, at 389 (2005). 
28 Kimberly Ferzan, Justification and Excuse, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY 
OF CRIMINAL LAW 239, 243-51(John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 2011). 
29 F LETCHER, supra note 14, § 10.4.1, at 818 (noting that necessity can function as a 
justification and an excuse); Baron, supra note 13, at 389 (noting that duress is usually an 
excuse but can be a justification). 
30 It goes almost without saying that different legislatures and courts at different times 
have reached different judgments as to when circumstances render the commission of a 
wrong understandable in the requisite sense.      9 
 
phase of a criminal proceeding, a defendant’s addiction or abusive childhood might 
provide a partial excuse warranting a lesser punishment.31  In short, law can and 
does recognize different kinds of excuses in different ways and to different effect.32 
   
C. Denials and Excuses Revisited 
  Although I have distinguished excuses from other kinds of responses to 
allegations of wrongdoing, it will aid the cause of clarity to acknowledge ways in 
which these categories overlap.   
  As was noted above, denials are always keyed to the definition of the wrong(s) 
being denied. Because wrongs such as crimes and torts tend to be defined to require 
volitional action on the part of the alleged wrongdoer, some denials will rest on a 
claim that the defendant’s action was not volitional.  In turn, these sorts of denials 
will sometimes invoke considerations that would support an excuse if the wrongs in 
question had been defined differently. 
  For example, suppose a criminal defendant argues that he should not be 
convicted of assault because his attack took place while under hypnosis. This 
defendant can plausibly be understood as making an excuse for his assault. Yet a 
criminal code might instead classify this particular responsive argument as a denial. 
In doing so, it would be treating an assault committed by a hypnotized actor as 
failing to count as the actor’s doing—it would be as if a third person had picked up 
the hypnotized actor and thrown him into the victim. There is no need for an excuse 
in this situation, because excuses come into play only when a wrongful act is more 
robustly attributable to the actor making the excuse. Not surprisingly, the instances 
in which criminal and tort law recognizes excuse-like denials of this sort are 
instances in which the disconnect between the defendant’s acts and his capacity for 
agency is particularly dramatic.   
  Standard requirements of volitional action as a condition of criminal or tort 
liability will in this way tend to free actors from liability for conduct that might be 
excused were that requirement watered down or eliminated.33 A responsive plea that 
the wrongful act in question was not really the act of the defendant is a denial of 
wrongdoing, but it is a denial on the basis of excuse-like factors. Obviously other 
                                                      
31 Generally speaking, the punishment phase of a criminal trial calls for a consideration 
of all relevant information pertaining to the defendant’s commission of the crime. Williams v. 
New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (observing that judges are constitutionally permitted to 
sentence, and should sentence, on the basis of “the fullest information possible concerning 
the defendant’s life and characteristics”).  Information that might support an excuse relevant 
to sentencing tends to be provided to courts through presentence reports, but also can be 
introduced at trial or via a defendant’s allocution.  The instances in which, and the extent to 
which, a judge or jury can reduce a defendant’s punishment in light of a proffered excuse 
depends on the type of punishment being administered and the relevant statutory and 
regulatory framework for punishment. Schemes of indeterminate, non-guideline sentencing, 
for example, will tend to give judges more leeway to credit excuses than a guidelines-based 
schemes, though the latter also recognize certain excuses as grounds for reducing 
punishment.        
32 Mitchell N. Berman, Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality, 53 DUKE L.J. 1, 26-
28, 56-57 (2003) (emphasizing the normative dimension of decisions as to what should be 
recognized within criminal law as a justification or an excuse). Whether this pattern of 
recognized excuses is defensible is a question beyond the scope of this Article. 
33 GOUDKAMP, supra note 1, at 88. 10 
 
denials—for example, a denial insisting that the defendant was not even present at 
the scene of an alleged assault—are not connected to excuses in this way.   
  Recognition of the overlap between denials and excuses is important not only to 
the cause of clarity, but also to avoid attributing excessive significance to the limited 
role that excuses play in criminal law, and to their absence in tort. Just because 
there are no excuses in tort does not mean that one can be held liable for injuries 
caused by bodily movements that are the product of physical compulsion by another.  
Limits on criminal and tort liability that could be fashioned as excuses are already 
built into the definition of crimes and torts, and hence are pleaded as denials. At the 
same time, it hardly follows from the availability of these excuse-like denials that 
the presence or absence of excuses apart from excuse-like denials is unimportant. 
There is still plenty of room for excuses to operate to further limit liability.   
    
II. Does Tort Law Recognize Excuses? 
  In claiming that tort law does not recognize excuses, I am in good company.   
Jules Coleman, John Gardner, Joseph Raz, Arthur Ripstein, and Kenneth Simons 
has each asserted as much, though without much elaboration.34 Moreover, James 
Goudkamp has recently offered a fulsome defense of this claim.35 Still, some further 
elaboration is warranted.  I will, of course, stand with the conventional wisdom, 
though I will also aim to put it in proper perspective, and will acknowledge certain 
qualifications.   
  By way of perspective, it is important to recall the concluding observation of Part 
I. Torts, like crimes, are defined in ways that already account for certain excusing 
conditions. An attack committed as a result of involuntary intoxication likely will 
not be deemed a battery because of the absence of anything that would count as a 
volitional act by the alleged tortfeasor. Lest it be read too broadly, the claim that 
tort law does not recognize excuses must be understood against this backdrop.   
  As for qualifications, I will offer two. First, I note below some instances in which 
tort law, in the course of defining certain torts and tort defenses, arguably allows 
excuses to defeat liability. These instances are nonetheless marginal, and not merely 
in a practical sense. They are conceptually marginal in that they involve invocations 
                                                      
34 RIPSTEIN, supra note 20, at 138-39 (treating excuses in law as belonging exclusively to 
the domain of punishment); JULES  L.  COLEMAN,  RISKS AND WRONGS 224, 259-63 (1992) 
(arguing that tort law does not recognize excuses that defeat culpability but does recognize 
excuses that defeat the attribution of an injurious act to an agent on the ground that the 
injury victim has no claim in justice to repair by that agent); Bruce Chapman, A Theory of 
Criminal Law Excuses, 1 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 75, 78 (1988) (observing that mistake and “quite 
possibly necessity” do not operate as excuses in tort law); John Gardner, Justification Under 
Authority, 23 CANADIAN J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 71, 92 (2010) (asserting that tort law “makes 
no room for excuses”); Joseph Raz, Responsibility and the Negligence Standard, 30 OXFORD J. 
LEG. STUDIES 1, 9-10 (2010) (arguing that it is a conceptual mistake to think of negligence 
law as granting an excuse to actors who act with due care; excuses “are not relevant to 
compensation”);  cf. Kenneth Simons, The Crime/Tort Distinction: Legal Doctrine and 
Normative Perspectives, 17 WIDENER L.J. 719, 725 (2008) (noting that excuses to liability are 
recognized in criminal law “much more readily” than in tort). As Goudkamp notes, probably 
the highest-profile dissenter from the conventional wisdom is George Fletcher.  GOUDKAMP, 
supra note 1, at 83, 86-88 (discussing George Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 
85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 551-56 (1972)).  
35 GOUDKAMP, supra note 1, at 82-101. 11 
 
of excuses to define the outer boundaries of tortious conduct rather than providing 
independent grounds for leniency toward actors who have committed torts. Second, I 
will concede that fact-finders are granted a certain leeway to take account of excuses 
when awarding punitive damages and when apportioning liability among 
tortfeasors. 
  Finally, it is worth acknowledging the obvious point that real-world litigation 
often goes beyond doctrinal bounds. Thus, even if excuses are not technically 
relevant to a legal issue in a tort case, a defense lawyer might well seek to introduce 
evidence of considerations that would support the finding of an excuse in another 
setting. Likewise, insofar as juries make judgments about liability and damages in a 
holistic manner, they probably sometimes take into account evidence of excuses, 
even if that evidence is not strictly relevant to the elements of the plaintiff’s prima 
facie case or to affirmative defenses raised by the defendant. In principle, a 
scrupulous trial judge might exclude excuse-related evidence for lack of relevance. 
But insofar as judges do not, there is no formal mechanism that would exclude 
jurors from contemplating excuses in determining liability. This feature of tort 
litigation perhaps further enhances the sense in which excuses operate at the 
margins of tort doctrine to expand the domain of recognized denials and 
justifications. 
  
A.  Tort Law’s Missing Nominate Excuses 
  Tort law does not contain counterparts to criminal law’s nominate excuses. One 
does not find “duress” or “provocation” marked off as discrete defenses in tort 
treatises.36 And there is no evidence that modern law in this respect departs from 
earlier iterations.  Indeed, the available evidence cuts the other way.  At the 
beginning of the seventeenth century, the King’s Bench in Weaver v. Ward offered 
the now-famous bit of dictum that a “lunatick” could be subject to liability via a 
personal injury action even if he would not be eligible for criminal punishment.37 
Although  Weaver’s dictum seems to address a claim of general incapacity, its 
reasoning applies, a fortiori, to a claim of excuse based on mental disability. Not long 
after Weaver, in Gilbert v. Stone, the same court rejected an attempt by a defendant 
                                                      
36 Id. at 88-89 (noting the absence of provocation and duress defenses to tort liability).  
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 73, illus. 1 (1965) (noting that one who kills 
another under duress is subject to liability to the estate of the victim). 
The second Torts Restatement contains a chapter titled “Justification and Excuse.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Ch. 45 (1979). However, the chapter mentions a grab-bag 
of defenses and makes no attempt to set out systematically what might count as a legally 
recognized excuse for the commission of a tort.  A few decisions—mostly from lower courts, 
and mostly issued before 1970—hold that evidence of a victim’s having provoked a 
tortfeasor’s attack can be considered as grounds for reducing the victim’s compensatory 
damage award.  Andrea G. Nadel, Provocation as Basis for Mitigation of Compensatory 
Damages in Action for Assault and Battery, 35 A.L.R.4th 947 § 4 (1985); see  infra  text 
accompanying note 94. 
37 80 E.R. 284, 284 (1616). Goudkamp reports that seventeenth century commentators, 
including Bacon and Hale, concurred on this point.  GOUDKAMP, supra note 1, at 166-67.  The 
black letter law seems not to have changed much between the seventeenth and twentieth 
centuries.  See A RTHUR  UNDERHILL,  A  SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF TORTS, OR WRONGS 
INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 45 (11th Ed. 1925) (“no doubt a lunatic is generally liable in 
tort”).   12 
 
sued for conversion to claim duress as an excuse.38  On the issue of excuses (and 
incapacities), George Wilson’s 1800 edition of Matthew Hale’s History of the Pleas of 
the Crown contrasted criminal and tort law’s treatment of infancy, dementia, 
ignorance, necessity and “fear” on still-familiar terms: 
[o]rdinarily none of these do excuse those persons, that are under them, from 
civil actions to have pecuniary recompense for injuries done, as trespasses, 
batteries, woundings; because such a recompense is not by way of penalty, but 
a satisfaction for damage done to the party: but in cases of crimes and 
misdemeanors, where the proceeding against them is ad poenam, the law in 
some cases, and under certain temperaments takes notice of these defects, 
and in respect of them relaxeth or abateth the severity of their punishment.39 
  The difference between criminal and tort law with respect to the recognition of 
nominate excuses can be further illustrated by considering their respective 
treatments of “necessity.” However, some brush-clearing is first required because, as 
noted above, the term “necessity” can be used to refer both to a justification and an 
excuse.40 Qua justification, “necessity” usually is an invocation of the “lesser evils” 
defense, although it may also refer to an expanded notion of self-defense. Qua 
excuse, “necessity” is akin to duress, but points to background conditions rather 
than wrongful actions by third parties as the influence to which an actor has 
succumbed.    
  The criminal law chestnut of Dudley and Stephens—in which sailors adrift at sea 
with no apparent hope of rescue killed and cannibalized their shipmate—illustrates 
the two sides of the concept of necessity, although the defendants ultimately failed 
in their efforts to benefit from either.41 The court first construed the defendants’ plea 
of necessity as a justification, implicitly declining to apply the choice-of-evils 
defense, and explicitly rejecting the idea that self-defense could extend to the killing 
of a person who posed no threat to the killers.42  The court then entertained the 
argument that necessity excused the killing—that the defendants’ desperate 
situation was a ground for treating them less harshly. The court rejected this 
argument too. Rather than assessing the defendants’ actions against the standard of 
an ordinarily resilient person, who might well have succumbed in such a dire 
situation,43 the court applied the standard of a person of extraordinary resolve, 
exemplified by the soldier who is fully prepared to heed his “duty of dying for 
                                                      
38 But see Waller v. Parker, 45 Tenn. 476 (1868) (recognizing a duress defense to a tort 
claim).   
39 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 15 (George Wilson ed., 
1800) (1736). 
40 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
41 Regina v. Dudley, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884). 
42 The court approvingly invoked Hale for the proposition that the prospect of imminent 
starvation does not justify theft of property, much less the intentional killing of another. Id. 
at 283. 
43 Id. at 287 (“It must not be supposed that in refusing to admit temptation to be an 
excuse for crime it is forgotten how terrible the temptation was; how awful the suffering; how 
hard in such trials to keep the judgment straight and the conduct pure.  We are often 
compelled to set up standards that we cannot reach ourselves, and to lay down rules which 
we could not ourselves satisfy.”). 13 
 
others.”44 In so reasoning, the court essentially concluded that, no matter how trying 
the circumstances, a murder cannot be excused.  
  In contrast to the defendants in Dudley, those criminally prosecuted for lesser 
crimes can occasionally benefit from necessity, primarily in the form of the lesser 
evils justification. For example, a prisoner who escapes to avoid being injured by a 
prison fire, or to avoid otherwise unavoidable sexual abuse, may be able to claim 
necessity as a justification for the escape.45 Likewise, in criminal law, certain thefts 
might be deemed justified if necessary to prevent imminent harm, such as 
starvation.46 In some situations, necessity does not justify a crime, nor fully excuse 
it, but can provide a ground for leniency in punishment.47  
  In tort law, the concept of necessity is most famously associated with Vincent v. 
Lake Erie Transportation Co.48 The defendant’s ship was scheduled to depart from 
the plaintiff’s dock when a powerful storm arose. To avoid losing the ship, the 
captain kept it at the dock without the consent of the dock owner. The storm 
battered the ship against the dock, causing damage for which the dock owner sought 
compensation. The ship’s owner argued against liability on the ground that the 
captain’s “conduct during the storm was rendered necessary by prudence and good 
seamanship under conditions over which [he] had no control….”49 A divided 
Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a judgment for the plaintiff dock owner.   
  Vincent has come to stand for the idea that tort law recognizes a partial 
affirmative defense to trespass known as the incomplete privilege of private 
necessity.50 The privilege, on this reading of the case, is found in the majority’s 
                                                      
44 Id.  A tort analogue to this holding is the rule that imposes liability on an actor who 
intentionally uses another person as a shield to ward off a third-party’s attack. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 73, illus. 2 (1965).  
45  See, e.g., State v. Ottwell, 784 P.2d 402, 404 (1989) (discussing cases recognizing 
necessity as a justification for escape). 
46 Model Penal Code, Comment to §3.02, at 9-14 (1985) (explaining that the Code’s choice-
of-evils defense was intended to encompass a case in which mountain climbers lost in a storm 
appropriate provisions from another’s cabin in order to survive); see also State v. Rasmussen, 
524 N.W.2d 843 (N.D. 1994) (defendant, a passenger in a car unexpectedly abandoned by its 
driver in a deadly storm, was justified in committing the crime of driving without a license to 
avoid serious injury that could have resulted from remaining in the car or abandoning it). 
47 Long v. Commonwealth, 478 S.E.2d 324, 327 (Va. App. 1996) (necessity can be factored 
into sentencing of the defendant as a habitual offender). 
48 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910). For an opinionated survey of the literature on Vincent, see 
Stephen D. Sugarman, The “Necessity” Defense And The Failure Of Tort Theory: The Case 
Against Strict Liability For Damages Caused While Exercising Self-Help In An Emergency, 5 
ISSUES IN LEGAL  SCHOLARSHIP  (2005),  http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/ils.2005.5.issue-
2/ils.2005.5.2.1063/ils.2005.5.2.1063.xml?format=INT.  
49 124 N.W., at 221 (emphasis added). 
50 R ESTATEMENT  (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 (1965).  Certain cases of so-called “public 
necessity,” by contrast, may provide the defendant with a justification that defeats liability.  
For example, the 1608 decision in Mouse’s Case arguably holds that property may be 
intentionally destroyed if necessary to save lives in response to a life-threatening emergency, 
the existence of which is not anyone’s fault. 77 Eng. Rep. 1341, 1342 (K.B. 1608). Whether 
public necessity justifies a trespass outside of the emergency context is a question that 
exceeds the scope of the current project.  For a brief argument that English tort law is 
consonant with prevailing law in the U.S. on the issue of necessity in trespass, see John C. P. 14 
 
implicit endorsement of a prior Vermont decision, Ploof v. Putnam.51  I n  Ploof a 
family docked their boat at the defendant’s dock during a storm. However, the 
defendant’s employee, pursuant to his employer’s instructions, cast off the boat, as a 
result of which the family members and their boat were harmed.52  The defendant’s 
attempt to dismiss the family’s ensuing suit on the pleadings was rejected by the 
Vermont Supreme Court, which reasoned that a jury might find the mooring of the 
boat was necessary under the circumstances.53  Private necessity, Ploof thus seemed 
to say, grants a trespasser a privilege against having a property owner exercise the 
right to exclude others. However, according to Vincent, this privilege is “incomplete” 
because there still must be payment for any damage caused by remaining on the 
property without permission. The standard reading of Vincent thus carries at least a 
suggestion that necessity operates as an excuse for the tort of trespass to land. On 
this reading, a trespasser is ‘forgiven’ his trespass to the extent of not being subject 
to expulsion, yet is not completely forgiven and hence must pay damages.  
  The problems with this reading are twofold.  First, insofar as the court treats 
necessity as counting in favor of the boat owner, it does so on terms suggesting that 
necessity is functioning as a denial or justification rather than an excuse. The court 
nowhere suggests that the emergency facing the ship generated a reason to grant 
the ship’s owner some sort of leniency with respect to the terms on which it would be 
held accountable for its trespass. Rather, the court seems to commend the ship 
captain’s conduct as reasonable, all things considered.54 
  Second, and more fundamentally, the “incomplete privilege” idea makes a hash 
of Vincent’s reasoning.55  The court did not conclude that the boat captain’s trespass 
was partially privileged. Rather, it concluded that this was an entirely unprivileged 
trespass—a trespass plain and simple.  To be sure, the captain had acted prudently, 
and his prudence would thus have defeated a claim by the dock owner alleging 
negligence causing property damage. But the tort of trespass to land is not the tort 
of negligence: lack of prudence is no part of the definition of trespass.  If the boat, 
while at sea, had been thrown against the dock by the storm despite the captain’s 
prudent seamanship, there would be no liability for negligence (no lack of prudence) 
or trespass (no intentional touching of the dock).  “But here those in charge of the 
vessel deliberately and by their direct efforts held her in such a position that damage 
to the dock resulted….”56 By choosing to keep the boat at the dock after permission 
had expired, the captain did all that was needed to be done to commit a trespass. 
That it was a wise choice is irrelevant to the question of whether the plaintiff could 
make out a prima facie case of trespass.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
Goldberg, Tort Law’s Missing Excuses, in TORT LAW DEFENSES ___ (Andrew Dyson, James 
Goudkamp & Frederick Wilmot-Smith eds., forthcoming 2014). 
51 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908). 
52 Id. at 188-89. 
53 Id. at 189.   
54 Because the trespass was reasonable, it was by definition neither malicious nor wanton 
and hence could not generate an award of punitive damages.  Vincent in this sense treated 
necessity as the grounds for a partial denial.  See infra text accompanying notes 88-89.  
55 This reading of Vincent is articulated in JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK & 
BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITY AND REDRESS 823-30 (3d ed. 2012).  It was 
first suggested to me in outline by Ben Zipursky. 
56 124 N.W., at 222 (emphasis added). 15 
 
  Nor, according to the court, does prudence count as an affirmative defense to 
trespass. However reasonable, the trespass was neither justified nor excused. To 
commend the captain’s decision to keep the boat at the dock was not to conclude that 
the dock owner lacks grounds for complaining that the captain’s decision unlawfully 
came at his expense: “having thus preserved the ship at the expense of the dock, it 
seems to us that her owners are responsible to the dock owners to the extent of the 
injury inflicted.”57  
  What about the Vincent  court’s implicit suggestion that the ship owner was 
entitled to remain at the dock during the storm without the dock owner’s 
permission?  Can this aspect of Vincent be explained without recognizing an excuse 
for the ship owner?  In fact, the ship’s entitlement to stay at the dock was not 
grounded in any privilege enjoyed by the ship owner.  Rather, it was an application 
of the rule limiting a possessor of land to the use of “reasonable” self-help measures 
to enforce his right to exclude.58 In other words, it was not the prudence of the ship’s 
captain that grounded a privilege to remain. It was instead the imprudence of any 
decision to cast off the ship that denied the dock owner the authority to do so. 
 In  sum,  Vincent did not involve a denial, a justification, or an excuse.  The court 
simply determined that the ship’s captain had (for good reason) committed a 
trespass, and hence should be held liable in the usual way.  One might object to this 
reading that it interprets trespass law as sending an odd or inappropriate message 
to persons, like the ship captain, facing emergency situations.59 For, even though, in 
this sort of situation, prudence counsels that the captain keep the ship at the dock, 
the law of trespass, on the reading offered here, directs the captain to leave the dock.  
  However, to note this feature of trespass law is merely to observe that the 
scheme of rights and duties recognized in private law sometimes directs actors to 
refrain from conduct that is ultimately warranted as a matter of morality.  Suppose 
Darla has contracted to sell a unique good to Pat, but then, just prior to the time of 
delivery, Darla discovers that selling or giving the good to Terry is the only way to 
save Terry’s life (whereas the sale to Pat will bring only enjoyment to Pat). Darla 
presumably should sell or give the good to Terry even if this amounts to a breach of 
contract, and hence a legal wrong as to Pat.  Likewise, Vincent tells us that it is a 
legal  wrong to the property owner to remain on the owner’s property without 
permission, not that it is in all respects wrong to do so.  It thus confronts the captain 
with the choice of whether to act in a way that, while commendable given the larger 
interests at stake, is still a tort.           
  One other apparent counterexample to the claim that tort law does not recognize 
nominate excuses—a seemingly blatant one—is the recognition of “excuses” within 
the doctrine of negligence per se.  According to that doctrine, an actor’s violation of a 
statutory standard of safe conduct can suffice to establish that the actor failed to act 
with ordinary care. Yet courts recognize certain “excuses” that, where applicable, 
deny statutory violations this effect. The “excuse” label notwithstanding, the 
overwhelming majority of these grounds consist of justifications.   
  The ameliorative considerations recognized by courts in applying the doctrine of 
negligence per se are a response to the fact that statutory and regulatory 
                                                      
57 Id.  
58 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 77 (1965) (outlining the privilege to use reasonable 
force to prevent or terminate another’s intrusion upon one’s land). 
59 Thanks to Stephen Smith for raising this objection. 16 
 
requirements tend to be stated on strict terms. For example, a statute requiring 
drivers to use headlights when driving after dark will tend to be written with 
unqualified language suggesting that a driver can be deemed careless even if her 
headlights fail suddenly and unexpectedly despite her prudent maintenance of the 
car, and despite her having had no opportunity to remedy the problem or safely 
cease driving before an accident is caused by the absence of headlights. Even 
extraordinary care, in other words, cannot constitute a denial of wrongdoing, given 
the hell-or-high-water terms of this sort of requirement. Instead, the courts treat an 
actor’s reasons for violating the statute as sometimes sufficing to establish a 
justification. Thus, a violation is deemed ‘excused’ (i.e., justified) if it occurs despite 
the violator having made all reasonable efforts to comply with the statute.60 
Likewise, a violation will not support a negligence per se finding when “the actor’s 
compliance with the statute would involve a greater risk of physical harm to the 
actor or to others than would noncompliance.”61  
  Although ‘excuses’ for statutory violations are thus usually justifications, they 
are defined broadly enough to encompass certain genuine excuses. For example, if 
noncompliance with a statutory safety requirement results from an actor’s 
reasonable mistake as to the requirement (or as to the applicability of the statute), it 
is possible that the violation is best understood as excused rather than justified.  
Likewise if a negligence faced circumstances that gave her no opportunity at all to 
avoid violating the applicable statute—for example, a case in which a car’s brakes 
suddenly fail without warning, causing the driver, seconds after the failure, to run a 
stop sign and thereby strike a pedestrian who is lawfully crossing the road.  Even in 
such a case, however, the excuse serves only to defeat the effort to use the statutory 
violation to prove carelessness. In other words, even if ‘excuses’ to negligence per se 
include genuine excuses, these are not excuses for torts. Instead they block a 
particular gambit within tort litigation. A defendant who successfully counters a 
negligence per se argument by invoking an excuse still faces the prospect of being 
held liable for carelessly injuring another. Indeed, even if the statutory violation is 
excused, the fact of the violation can still be introduced by the plaintiff as evidence of 
the defendant’s carelessness. The violation’s being excused merely prevents it from 
definitively resolving the question of whether the defendant acted carelessly.  
     
 
                                                      
60 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 15(b) 
(2010); Busby v. Quail Creek Golf & Country Club, 885 P.2d 1326 (Okla. 1994) (defendant 
club’s unlawful serving of alcohol to minors held not to be a basis for negligence per se 
because the club made reasonable efforts to determine that the minors were of drinking age 
before serving them). Dobbs argues that “excuses” for negligence per se are overwhelmingly 
recognitions that the defendant is required by negligence to exercise ordinary care, and is not 
properly subject to strict liability.  DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §141, at 330 (2001). 
61 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §15(e) 
(2010).  In the well-known case of Tedla v. Ellman, 19 N.E.2d 987 (N.Y. 1939), the plaintiff 
was walking along the side of a busy road with her back to traffic, in violation of a statute 
requiring pedestrians to walk against traffic. The defendant, who ran into the plaintiff, 
invoked the plaintiff’s statutory violation as grounds for establishing per se contributory 
negligence.  The court rejected this argument, finding that, because of construction at the 
site of the accident, the plaintiff had in fact chosen the safer course of conduct by walking 
with traffic.        17 
 
B.  Excuses and Compensatory Damages 
  To note the absence of nominate excuses in tort law is already to observe a 
significant departure from criminal law. However, it does not preclude the 
possibility that excuses enjoy informal recognition in tort, as they often do in 
criminal sentencing. In the U.S., for tort cases in which the plaintiff wins a verdict, a 
jury typically will exercise broad discretion in determining the amount of 
compensatory damages to award the plaintiff.  One might thus fairly ask whether 
the damages phase of a tort trial is comparable to the sentencing phase of criminal 
trials in allowing for consideration of partial excuses. It is not.62   
  Standard instructions inform jurors that their task in setting damages is to 
provide an amount that will fairly, reasonably, or adequately compensate the 
plaintiff for his tort-related injuries or losses, past and future.63 The primary focus is 
on the tort’s impact on the victim rather than the wrongfulness of the defendant’s 
conduct. In considering the plaintiff’s out-of-pocket costs, lost earnings, pain and 
suffering, and lost enjoyment of life, there is little occasion to contemplate possible 
excuses. 
  Excuses might sometimes play a modest role in this context.  This is in part 
because the idea of being adequately compensated for an injury contains an 
ambiguity. While the term “injury” is commonly understood to refer to the 
consequences of suffering a wrong, it can also be understood to refer to the wrong 
itself.64 Tort plaintiffs are probably entitled to be compensated (and may sometimes 
be compensated) for the very fact of having been wronged, apart from the further 
consequences of the wrong.  One can make the same point in the language of 
damages. It will sometimes be plausible for a fact-finder to calibrate the plaintiff’s 
“suffering” to the gravity of the tort committed against her.  For example, a person 
whose only tort-related injury is a broken leg might be entitled to recover more by 
way of compensation for her suffering if the physical harm resulted from an 
intentional beating, as opposed to mere carelessness. By implication, a defendant’s 
proffering of an excuse for his tortious wrongdoing could conceivably count in favor 
of lower compensation, on the theory that less suffering attends or ought to attend 
harm that results from a lesser wrong.  
                                                      
62 The focus in this section is on compensatory damages.  As noted above and discussed 
below, excuses can play a role in the apportionment of damages and the award of punitive 
damages.  Likewise, excuses might be relevant to a court’s decision on whether to grant a 
request for injunctive relief in a case of nuisance or continuing trespass. 
63 See, e.g., Clemente v. State, 707 P.2d 818, 828 (Cal. 1985) (in general, a tort victim is 
entitled to “adequate” compensation for the harm resulting from the tort); Mangione v. 
Giordano, 2013 WL 3958280 (Conn. Super. 2013) (“The rule of damages [in a negligence case) 
is as follows. Insofar as money can do it, the plaintiff is to receive fair, just and reasonable 
compensation for all losses, past and future, which are proximately caused by the defendant's 
proven negligence.”) (citation omitted); Buhring v. Tavoletti, 905 N.E.2d 1059 (Ind. App. 
2009) (“In general, ‘[a] person injured by the negligence of another is entitled to reasonable 
compensation.’”) (quoting Berman v. Cannon, 878 N.E.2d 836, 841 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), 
trans. denied); N.Y. P.J.I.—Civil 2:277 (successful negligence plaintiff entitled to recover 
money that will “justly and fairly compensate” plaintiff for all losses resulting from injuries 
sustained). 
64 John C. P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 439 
(2006). 18 
 
  These caveats notwithstanding, the effect of excuses on compensatory damage 
awards is likely minimal. The compensatory damages phase of tort litigation focuses 
on the victim, not the wrongdoer. Certainly there is nothing in the process of 
awarding damages that even resembles a sentencing hearing based on a presentence 
report identifying facts and circumstances that render the defendant’s crime more 
understandable and more forgivable. 
 
C.  Excuses at the Margin of Denials and Justifications 
  When excuses figure in substantive tort law they are invoked at the margins, to 
fill out the definitions of particular torts or particular justifications. In short, courts 
occasionally shrink the description of certain torts, or stretch the definition of 
certain justifications, to cover special cases in which an actor’s conduct is perhaps 
most accurately described as tortious-but-excused. But they do so to ensure that tort 
law fully credits certain denials and justifications rather than out of an inclination 
to recognize excuses in their own right.   
  
  1. Negligence: Sudden Emergencies.  Negligence is much more central to modern 
tort law than criminal law.  Criminal law thus has far fewer occasions to consider 
excuses in connection with negligence.  Moreover, as we will see, the misconduct at 
the core of negligence—the failure to take due care—is of a sort that sometimes 
seems to collapse the space between denials and excuses.  Still, there is little 
evidence that negligence law leaves a significant role for excuses. 
  The breach element of negligence is determined by application of the ordinary 
care standard. That standard is notoriously insensitive even to pleas of general 
incapacity. This was, in effect, the message of Weaver v. Ward (mentioned above), 
and it is a clear implication of the foundational English decision of Vaughan v. 
Menlove.65   
  Vaughan in the first instance concerned an effort at denial rather than an 
excuse. Having accidentally started a fire that spread to his neighbor’s property, 
Menlove argued that he had done his best to be prudent and thereby fully 
discharged the duty of care set by negligence law. The court flatly rejected this 
argument, reasoning that negligence is to be adjudged by an ‘objective’ standard. 
Hence Menlove’s attempted denial failed.  In holding that a plea of doing one’s best 
fails to defeat a claim of negligence, Vaughan further entails that a failure of 
prudence that is attributable to a defect in one’s judgment or motor skills, even if an 
entirely understandable failure, does not excuse carelessness.  
  The objectivity of the standard of care thus ensures that liability will attach in 
many cases in which an actor can plausibly claim an excuse. Suppose an 
inexperienced driver panics while driving at night in a heavy rainstorm, even 
though other drivers around him are adequately managing the difficult conditions.  
In his panic, the driver swerves out of his lane and into another car. The driver is 
subject to liability for negligence: his inexperience is irrelevant. The same goes for a 
pharmacist who, only because he is distraught over the recent death of a family 
member, misfills a prescription and accidentally poisons a customer. Or imagine a 
person who ends up being trapped in a small, dark storeroom. Despite not being in 
immediate physical danger, and despite being reassured that help is on the way, he 
is overcome by claustrophobia and shatters a window in an effort to escape. Under 
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the objective standard, he can be deemed to have carelessly caused injury to a 
passerby who is cut by the flying glass.  
  Negligence law demands a certain level of competence in the performance of 
one’s actions, and is largely indifferent even to seemingly impressive explanations of 
why a given actor on a given occasion acted incompetently.  In this respect, tort law 
perhaps stands in partial contrast to criminal law.  To the extent that “criminal 
negligence” involves greater culpability than the sort of “simple negligence” that can 
give rise to tort liability, the difference may in part reflect criminal law’s greater 
receptivity to at least some excuse-like considerations.66  
  One facet of negligence law—the “sudden emergency doctrine”—might seem to 
invite consideration of excuses.  According to that doctrine, one who is alleged to 
have acted carelessly is entitled to point to the fact that he was facing an unexpected 
emergency as a ground for avoiding liability. In doing so, however, the actor does not 
claim an excuse for her carelessness. Rather she denies having been careless. A 
driver who hits another car after swerving to avoid a large object that without 
warning falls in front of her car can argue to the jury that, even in swerving, she 
drove with all the competence that was required of her. “The emergency doctrine 
does not excuse fault; it defines the conduct to be expected of a prudent person in an 
emergency situation.”67 It is “an application of the reasonable person standard, with 
the emergency as one of the circumstances to be considered in forming a judgment 
about the actor’s fault.”68  
  It is possible that certain elaborations of the sudden emergency doctrine treat it 
as a denial-excuse hybrid. In such cases, however, the courts treat excused 
carelessness as if there had been no carelessness at all. This description perhaps fits 
Cordas v. Peerless Transportation Co.,69 famously cited by George Fletcher in 
support of the claim that tort law generally recognizes excuses.70 In Cordas, a robber 
seeking to make his escape jumped onto the sideboard of a taxi and, at gun point, 
ordered the driver to drive off.71 The driver at first complied but then jammed on the 
brakes and bailed out of the car.72 The driverless vehicle then mounted a nearby 
sidewalk, causing minor injuries to the plaintiff and her children.73 In dismissing 
their claim against the cab driver, the trial judge held that driver was not careless 
                                                      
66 Thanks to Carol Steiker for this suggestion.  Wayne LaFave reports that, when courts 
have sought to isolate the difference between criminal and civil negligence, they have tended 
to associate the former with riskier conduct, with the defendant’s subjective knowledge of the 
risks posed by his conduct, or a combination of the two. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 
§5.4(b), at 265-67 (4th ed. 2003). One can imagine some instances in which considerations 
that would count as an excuse for negligence—for example, the defendant’s understandable 
ignorance of the riskiness of his conduct—would also cut against finding that one of these 
aggravating conditions was present. But see Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. 
REV. 257, 275-78 (1987) (arguing that judgments about criminal negligence should be no less 
insensitive to excuses based on a defendant’s infirmities than judgments about tortious 
negligence).   
67 Regenstreif v. Phelps, 142 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. 2004). 
68 DOBBS, supra note 60, § 141, at 330.   
69 27 N.Y.S.2d 198 (N.Y. City Ct. 1941). 
70 Fletcher, supra note 34, at 552. 
71 27 N.Y.S.2d at 199. 
72 Id. 
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under the circumstances.74 However, in doing so the judge also invoked language 
suggesting that the conduct should not be deemed careless because it was excused, 
emphasizing that the situation was one that would “darken the intellect and palsy 
the will” of an ordinarily constituted person.75  
  Consider also Section 296 of the Second Restatement of Torts. Its black-letter 
provisions unequivocally treat the sudden emergency doctrine as bearing on whether 
an actor’s action was objectively prudent.76  Yet commentary to the section speaks in 
terms of an actor being “excused for an error of judgment in a sudden emergency.”77 
Likewise, some courts hold that the doctrine “‘excuses an unfortunate human choice 
of action that would be subject to criticism as negligent were it not that the party 
was suddenly faced with a situation which gave him no time to reflect upon which 
choice was best.’”78 In sum, negligence law may sometimes blur denials and excuses 
in sudden emergency situations, such that cases presenting a close question as to 
whether an actor has met the standard of care might be resolved in favor of the 
actor, even though the better description of the actor’s conduct is that it lacked 
ordinary care yet should be excused.     
  What goes for the sudden emergency defense also goes for judicial recognitions of 
“temporary insanity” as a basis for avoiding negligence liability.  Indeed, the courts 
here seem more consistently concerned with fleshing out the ordinary care standard 
rather than recognizing an excuse-based defense. If one has no reason to foresee that 
one is about to suffer a delusion, they reason, one is not careless to engage in 
conduct that would become dangerous if one were to suffer a delusion while 
engaging in it. This is why they analogize temporary insanity to the unforeseeable 
onset of a disabling physical condition such as a seizure. In all of these cases, the 
courts break down the defendant’s denial of wrongdoing into two steps. First, they 
treat the actions undertaken in the grips of the delusion or seizure as not 
attributable to the actor—as not his doing. Second, the courts widen the frame of 
reference to ask whether the person was unreasonable to engage in the conduct 
during which the delusion or seizure occurred. Absent reason to foresee that such an 
event would occur, the actor is deemed not to have been careless at this earlier 
stage.79 On this ‘conjunctive’ account—no fault in the background conduct 
attributable to the defendant, conjoined with no attribution to the defendant of 
immediately faulty conduct—there is no wrong committed by the defendant and 
hence no need for an excuse. 
                                                      
74 Id. at 202 (“The chauffeur—the ordinary man in this case—acted in a split second in a 
most harrowing experience. To call him negligent would be to brand him coward; the court 
does not so ….”). 
75 Id. at 201. 
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 296(1) (1965) (“the fact that the actor is confronted 
with a sudden emergency … is a factor in determining the reasonable character of his choice 
of action”). 
77 Id., cmt. c. 
78 Brown v. Spokane County Fire Prot. Dist. No. 1, 668 P.2d 571, 577 (Wash. 1983) 
(quoting Zook v. Baier, 514 P.2d 923, 929 (Wash. App. 1973)).      
79 This is my effort to make sense of statements found in the Second Restatement and 
elsewhere suggesting that the conduct of an actor who, without forewarning, experiences 
transitory delirium (or a heart attack) is to be judged by reference to the imagined behavior 
of the reasonable delirious person (or the reasonable heart attack victim).  See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 283C (1965). 21 
 
    
   2.  Battery: Reasonably Mistaken Self-Defense. As Goudkamp observes, a 
plausible candidate for a recognized excuse in tort is the special case of self-defense 
in which the defendant acts under the reasonable but mistaken belief that the 
plaintiff was a threat to him.80 A well-known example is Courvoisier v. Raymond.81   
  Courvoisier chased two nighttime intruders out of his home with a gun. Once 
outside, the intruders and some associates continued to menace Courvoisier, who 
fired at them. Raymond, a police officer, heard the shots and responded. As 
Raymond approached Courvoisier, Courvoisier shot Raymond. Raymond later 
claimed he had identified himself as an officer. However, Courvoisier claimed that 
he did not hear Raymond identify himself, that he saw Raymond reach toward his 
hip (presumably for a gun), and that, under the circumstances, he (Courvoisier) was 
therefore reasonable to believe that Raymond was about to attack him.   
  A jury found for Raymond on his tort claim against Courvoiser but the judgment 
was reversed. Under the trial judge’s instruction, the jury could find for Courvoisier 
only if it concluded that Raymond was actually attacking Courvoisier, which he was 
not. According to the Colorado Supreme Court, this instruction was erroneous, 
because it “excluded from the jury a full consideration of the justification claimed by 
the defendant.”82 The shooting would be justified if the jury believed Courvoisier’s 
account, and if it determined that his mistaking of Raymond’s actions as an attack 
was “excusable” because reasonable under the circumstances.      
  Self-defense is typically understood as a justification, and, as indicated, 
Courvoisier frames the issue on those terms. Still, the court also used the word 
“excusable,” which reflects the fact that this variant of self-defense has an excuse-
like quality. The defendant concedes that he did not, in the end, have good reason to 
use force against the plaintiff. His defense is that the circumstances were such that 
they not only caused him to misperceive the situation, but that they would similarly 
have misled a person of ordinary capacities. 
  The debate over whether self-defense based on a reasonable mistake is properly 
characterized as a justification or an excuse turns in part on questions of how 
reasons must figure in conduct in order to render conduct justifiable.83  However, 
one need not resolve these philosophical debates in order to conclude that, in tort, 
reasonably mistaken self-defense rarely, if ever, functions as an excuse. 
  Some cases of reasonable mistake lend themselves more readily to treatment as 
justified rather than excused. When the defendant’s mistake consists of 
misinterpreting actions by the victim that portend an imminent attack—as was 
perhaps the case in Courvoisier—the defendant would seem to have a strong claim 
to justification.  True, the victim does not mean for his actions to be threatening, but 
arguably they constitute a threat nonetheless. Indeed, one can argue that, so far as 
the law is concerned, a threat (in this context) just is an action of a sort that, under 
the circumstances, is likely to induce apprehension of imminent bodily harm in a 
person of ordinary resilience.84   
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81 47 P. 284 (Colo. 1896). 
82 Id. at 286 (emphasis added). 
83 GOUDKAMP, supra note 1, at 91-97. 
84 Benjamin C. Zipursky, Self Defense, Domination and the Social Contract, 57 U. PITT. L. 
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  By contrast, suppose that Devon knows that his long-time nemesis Nemo is 
looking to harm him. Walking down the street one night, Devon turns a corner only 
to encounter a pedestrian who closely resembles Nemo. The pedestrian stares 
intently at Devon because he is trying to determine if Devon is the person whom the 
pedestrian was planning to meet. Even if it would be reasonable for Devon to 
mistake the pedestrian for Nemo, and even if Devon in fact mistakes the 
pedestrian’s stare as portending an attack, Devon cannot point to any act by the 
pedestrian as constituting a threat in the requisite sense.  Arguably, then, any use of 
force by Devon against the pedestrian in the mistaken belief that the pedestrian was 
Nemo is at most excused, not justified.85 
  Courts probably have not defined the self-defense privilege with the sort of 
precision that would answer clearly whether, or on what grounds, they would apply 
the privilege in a case such as Devon’s.86 For its part, the Second Restatement of 
Torts rather scrupulously avoids taking a position, and more generally avoids giving 
a precise definition of the scope of the reasonably mistaken self-defense privilege.  
That it does so is consistent with my assertion that the courts seem inclined to leave 
some wiggle room at the borderline of justification and excuse.  The point of this 
studied ambiguity is not to ensure the availability to defendants of mistaken self-
defense as an excuse.  Rather, it is to ensure that the self-defense privilege extends 
to cover all cases of genuinely justified self-defense.  Excused self-defense in this way 
operates at the margins of justified self-defense.87 
  In both tort law and criminal law, self-defense is paradigmatically a justification. 
The defendant argues that her use of force against another was permissible because 
the force was used to ward off a certain kind of danger.  When courts consider when 
and how to recognize self-defense in cases of reasonable mistake, they are 
attempting to determine the breadth of this justification. Indeed, this is exactly how 
the issue is framed in Courvoisier—whether the defendant’s mistake was 
“excusable” so as to give him a “justification” for shooting Raymond. Even if some 
                                                      
85 Id. at 603 (offering a similar example). 
86 Sections 63 and 65 define the privilege of self-defense in terms of defending oneself 
against bodily harm that the defendant “reasonably believes that another is about to inflict 
intentionally upon him.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 63, 65 (1965).  This language 
leaves room for a relatively broad version of the privilege.  A comment to Section 63 further 
allows that “[t]he acts or statements of third persons may give to the other’s conduct so 
threatening an appearance as to make it capable of causing such an apprehension, though 
standing by itself, the conduct would not be capable of so doing.”  Id. § 63, cmt. i. The 
Restatement’s self-defense provisions also contrast with its provisions on mistakes as to 
consent. In the latter, the Restatement makes clear that a defendant’s reasonable mistake as 
to plaintiff’s consent will only operate as a privilege if the mistake was based on something 
the plaintiff did (or failed to do in a situation in which doing something would be expected).  
Id. § 892, cmt c.  This contrast again suggests that the Restatement supports the broader 
approach to mistaken self-defense. (On the other hand, all of the illustrations of legitimate 
invocations of self-defense involve mistakes arising from the victim’s actions.) For the 
thought that criminal law may have reason to not distinguish sharply between justifications 
and excuses, see Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 
COLUMBIA L. REV. 1897, 1898 (1984). 
87  Cf. JEREMY  HORDER,  EXCUSING  CRIME 56 (2004) (analyzing cases of self-defense 
involving excessive force as instances in which the justification of self-defense extends to 
cover conduct that is properly treated as excused). 23 
 
judicially recognized instances of mistaken self-defense are ultimately best 
understood as excused rather than justified, the context in which courts have 
recognized this privilege indicate that the courts are treating such conduct as if it 
were justified.  Cases of mistaken self-defense, they seem to suppose, are sufficiently 
close to being justified that they are deemed justified, if only to err on the side of 
vindicating pleas of genuinely justified self-defense.         
  
D. Where Excuses Come Into Play: Punitive Damages and Apportionment 
  For the sake of completeness, it is worth noting that excuses—or excuse-like 
considerations—sometimes figure in the law of remedies as it applies to tort cases. 
Specifically, they can factor into determinations as to the size of punitive damage 
awards, as well as the apportionment of liability between victim and tortfeasor, or 
between or among co-tortfeasors.  As explained below, to recognize that they operate 
in these parts of tort law is not to make a significant concession with respect to the 
Article’s doctrinal claim about the lack of excuses in tort.   
  Punitive damages, of course, constitute an extraordinary remedy that victims of 
certain ‘aggravated’ torts can request.  Juries are instructed to determine whether 
the defendant is eligible for punitive damages by virtue of having not merely 
committed the alleged tort, but further by having acted maliciously, wantonly, or 
with reckless disregard for the rights of others.88  Insofar as tort defendants point to 
extenuating circumstances as a means of establishing that their conduct was not 
wrongful in any of these ways, they are probably best understood as asserting 
partial denials rather than excuses for having committed a wrong.  
  Here it will be helpful to return to Vincent v. Lake Erie. Recall that, in that case, 
the boat owner’s invocation of necessity, among other things, defeated any 
suggestion that the trespass against the dock owner was malicious, wanton or 
reckless. Necessity thus operated as a partial denial: that is, a denial that the boat 
captain committed the sort of ‘aggravated’ trespass that might render the boat 
owner vulnerable to an award of punitive damages.  The point is not that necessity 
rendered the wrong sufficiently understandable as to be beyond punishment, but 
rather that it rendered the trespass not the sort of wrong for which punishment is 
permitted. 
  In contrast to its eligibility determination, the fact-finder’s setting of the size of a 
punitive damages award probably does leave room for excuses. Jurors are typically 
instructed to consider the “nature and reprehensibility” of the defendant’s conduct, 
including the extent to which it was consciously undertaken and systematic or 
continuous.  One can imagine that certain excusing conditions might serve to 
establish, for example, that a given actor’s reckless conduct was more 
understandable, and therefore warrants a lower award than other forms of reckless 
conduct.89  
  It is not particularly surprising that tort law allows consideration of excuses 
when turning from the question of liability for wrongdoing to the question of 
appropriate punitive awards for wrongdoing.  In such a case, the defendant is not 
permitted to make an excuse for his tort, nor to invoke an excuse to limit liability for 
compensatory damages. Rather, the excuse serves as a consideration that a fact-
finder can take into account in determining the extent to which the plaintiff may 
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extract additional funds from the defendant by way of a punitive response to the 
tort.  When accountability takes the particular form of punishment, it is appropriate 
to grant the defendant additional procedural and substantive protections, including 
the opportunity to make excuses.90    
  Turning to comparative fault and apportionment, excuses can figure in one of 
two ways.  First, some courts, perhaps a majority, maintain that the question of 
whether a plaintiff can be found at all at fault for her own injury—unlike the 
question of whether the defendant exercised reasonable care—is at least sometimes 
to be judged by a less stringently objective standard.  For example, a plaintiff with a 
mental disability that renders her less capable of caring for her own safety might be 
judged by the standard of persons with comparable disabilities, rather than the 
standard of a person without any such disability.91 The greater subjectivity of the 
standard for determining victim fault would seem, in principle, to leave room for 
excuses, though it is difficult to gauge the extent to which excuses actually do figure 
in such determinations. 
  Second, and perhaps more importantly, excuses can play a role in the 
apportionment of liability among multiple responsible parties. Thus, the Third Torts 
Restatement, which rejects the application of a less objective standard for 
determining victim fault, does so in part on the ground that subjective 
considerations can be taken into account by factfinders when they apportion fault 
among plaintiff and defendant.92 As specified in Section 8 of the Restatement’s 
Apportionment provisions, the comparative fault inquiry invites an assessment of 
the “nature” of each at-fault actor’s conduct that is of sufficient breadth to at least 
sometimes permit consideration of excuses.   
  For example, suppose that an elevator manufacturer’s carelessness causes an 
elevator car to become stuck before it levels off at the floor of a commercial 
building.93  The plaintiff, trapped inside, communicates by phone with the building’s 
security guard, who reassures her that he will be able to secure her release in about 
an hour.  Nonetheless, the plaintiff becomes claustrophobic and panics, pries open 
the elevator doors, and is injured attempting to pull herself up to the nearest floor. 
Even if it would be appropriate to assign some fault to the plaintiff in her negligence 
suit against the manufacturer, a judge or jury probably would be entitled to take 
into account the stress under which she acted as a reason to assign her a smaller 
percentage of responsibility than it would otherwise. Similarly, juries faced with 
apportioning liability among multiple tortfeasors responsible for a single injury 
                                                      
90 This is not to say that excuses, by their nature, mitigate only punishment as opposed 
to other forms of accountability. See infra text accompanying notes 97-Error! Bookmark not 
defined.. Rather, it is to say that excuses are particularly relevant when accountability takes 
the form of punishment. 
91 Anita Bernstein, The Communities that Make Standards of Care Possible, 77 CHI-KENT 
L.  REV. 735, 750-53 (2002) (focusing on the differing treatment of mental disabilities in 
determining plaintiffs’ and defendants’ fault); Richard W. Wright, Negligence in the Courts: 
Introduction and Commentary, 77 CHI.-KENT  L.  REV. 425, 472-80 (2002) (commenting on 
Bernstein). 
92 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 3, cmt. a (2000).   
93 This hypothetical is based on Phillips v. Fujitec America, Inc., 3 A.3d 324 (D.C. Ct. 
App. 2010) (affirming summary judgment for the defendant on grounds of contributory 
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might assign less fault to a tortfeasor who can claim a plausible excuse for its 
wrongdoing.94 
  As with punitive damages, the availability of excuses in this domain does not 
seem particularly threatening to the core doctrinal claim of this Article.  Insofar as 
tort law allows victims to make excuses for actions contributing to their own 
injuries, it is not offering leniency in the terms on which they are held accountable to 
others for having wrongfully injured those others.  Rather, they are allowing excuses 
to figure in the assessment of how the victim’s responsibility to look after herself 
counts against her ability to hold another accountable to her for having wrongfully 
injured her.  Likewise, allocations of fault among co-tortfeasors are not concerned 
with reducing the extent to which each is accountable to the victim, but rather to 
address the question of how liability should be shared as between or among them.  
As the common-law rule of joint and several liability for indivisible harms attests, to 
say that a careless actor with a good excuse for his carelessness should be deemed 
35% at fault for a plaintiff’s injury, whereas another actor who was similarly 
careless but without an excuse should be deemed 65% at fault, is not to conclude 
that the ‘excused’ actor is entitled to leniency.95  It is instead to acknowledge that 
there are others who happen to bear greater responsibility for the wrongful injuring 
of the plaintiff and who therefore should in principle be asked to bear more of the 
damages.   To say the same thing, the actor who can point to plausible grounds for 
an excuse stands to pay less in damages not because his mistreatment of the victim 
should be judges less severely, but merely because he has the good fortune of being 
one of two actors who each wrongfully caused the victim’s injury.     
  
III.  Explaining the Inexcusability of Torts 
  In this Part, I briefly consider some unsatisfactory attempts to account for tort 
law’s indifference to excuses, then sketch what I take to be a better explanation. 
 
A.  Excuses and Conduct Guidance 
  Meir Dan-Cohen famously suggested that criminal-law excuses such as duress 
contain legal directives that are addressed in the first instance to officials (primarily 
judges), not citizens.96 Arthur Ripstein subsequently invoked Dan-Cohen’s 
                                                      
94 Excuses are perhaps similarly applicable to apportionment issues arising from torts 
other than negligence. Thus, although no U.S. court recognizes “provocation” by the victim as 
a complete defense to a claim of battery, some will permit a jury to reduce a battery victim’s 
damages on the ground that the victim provoked the battery. See Nadel, supra note 36, at §4.  
These cases in effect allow juries to deem a provoked battery partially excused—that is, as a 
situation in which the defendant is less culpable for the plaintiff’s injury, such that the 
plaintiff should recover less than he would had the plaintiff borne no responsibility for the 
attack. 
95 Ravo v. Rogatnick, 514 N.E.2d 1104, 1108-09 (N.Y. 1987) (emphasizing that rules of 
contribution and indemnification aim to achieve fairness as between or among defendants 
rather than as between a defendant and plaintiff). The idea that joint and several liability is 
‘unfair’ to a co-tortfeasor who is made to pay in excess of his proportionate fault is but 
another manifestation of the same failure to appreciate the distinctiveness of tort notions of 
responsibility that renders puzzling tort law’s failure to recognize excuses.    
96 Meier Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in 
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 632-34 (1984); see also Berman, supra note 32, at 38 26 
 
suggestion as part of an effort to explain the distinctiveness of criminal law from tort 
law.97 An excuse in criminal law sets a limit on the state’s authority to use force 
against a wrongdoer as punishment for having committed a wrong. The state plays 
no comparable role in tort law.  Ergo, tort law has no place for excuses.   
  It strikes me as erroneous to suppose that excuses such as duress and 
provocation “speak to the state.”98  On their face, they are addressed to citizens. 
After all, they are contained in criminal codes, not merely in sentencing manuals.99 
Taking a step back from the criminal context, it is obvious that excuses are relevant 
to myriad quotidian interactions that have no prospect of garnering the attention of 
government officials.  One can sometimes offer a valid excuse for being late to meet a 
friend for lunch.  Clearly, then, excuses are capable of ‘speaking to the citizenry’ and 
not the state. What reason is there to suppose that excuses differ so dramatically in 
the legal domain?     
  To be sure, excuse norms have distinctive characteristics.  In criminal law and 
elsewhere they probably do not generate duties owed to anyone in particular. Of 
itself, a failure to demonstrate resilience in the face of duress or a provocation may 
not constitute a breach of a duty owed to a particular person or persons.  Even so, 
excuses such as duress identify circumstances in which a person is expected to resist 
certain pressures to act wrongfully. If one fails to resist in such circumstances, one 
falls short of a standard of how one ought to behave, and is subject to legitimate 
criticism for having fallen short.100   
  Likewise, it may be that excuses tend to guide conduct indirectly, by specifying 
situations in which an actor will not be able to mitigate or avoid responsibility for 
her actions.  But indirect guidance is still guidance. No less than the “objective” fault 
standard in negligence—which tells us, among other things, that liability cannot be 
avoided simply by doing one’s best to be careful—criminal law’s nominate excuses 
guide conduct in part by specifying various circumstances that will not excuse.  
  Finally, excuses guide conduct by setting norms concerning appropriate 
responses to misconduct. A directive that enjoins each of us to refrain from 
intentionally striking another speaks directly to the conduct in question. A directive 
that defines what will suffice to excuse an intentional striking of another speaks as 
much to the victim and third-parties—it indicates when others should or should not 
                                                                                                                                                                           
(arguing that the distinction between justifications and excuses just is that excuses are 
decision rules whereas justifications are conduct rules). 
97 RIPSTEIN, supra note 20, at 138-39; id. at 164 (“”In the legal context, excuses differ 
from justifications in that a justification shows an act to be rightful, whereas an excuse 
concedes the act was wrongful, but denies that the agent can be punished.”) (emphasis added).  
Ripstein does not specifically frame his analysis as an account of why excuses are absent 
from tort law, but it seems fair to infer such an account from his invocation of Dan-Cohen’s 
argument as part of an effort to explicate core differences between crime and tort.  
98 Id. at 139. 
99 Some excuses relevant only to sentencing might be best understood as decision rules, 
though not every such excuse should be.  A judicial decision to grant a lighter sentence based 
on the defendant’s having been under the sway of a powerful drug addiction still invokes 
norms of how one is expected to behave under such conditions. 
100 It is perhaps helpful to contrast legally recognized excuses with the so-called ‘duty to 
mitigate’ damages. Whereas the former set norms of primary conduct, the latter sets a 
condition that must be satisfied in order for one to have a legitimate claim to a certain level 
of compensation.     27 
 
show lenience toward the wrongdoer. As John Dewey, Peter Strawson, and Stephen 
Darwall have in different ways emphasized, there is nothing odd about norms of 
conduct being articulated through an account that focuses on responses to 
wrongdoing.101 Indeed, each has insisted that cognizance of legitimate responses to 
wrongdoing is central to the idea of holding persons responsible for their wrongs.102      
  
B. Excuses and Indemnification 
  Another flawed explanation for tort law’s lack of excuses also fastens on the 
difference between tort compensation and criminal punishment.  Tort suits typically 
result in liability, whereas criminal prosecutions typically result in punishment. 
This difference, the argument proceeds, helps explain the absence of excuses in tort, 
as the example of duress demonstrates.  
  Suppose Alex steals Matthew’s car only because Julie was holding a gun to Alex’s 
head.  It is tolerable for tort law to allow Matthew to recover damages from Alex—
notwithstanding the unbearable pressure that Alex was under when he converted 
Matthew’s car—because Alex can in principle seek indemnification from Julie, in 
which case responsibility and liability will ultimately lie where they ought to. By 
contrast, because there is no possibility of indemnification with respect to criminal 
punishment, criminal law recognizes duress as an excuse.  A version of the same 
point might be made in connection with persons who carry insurance to cover 
liabilities arising out of their careless acts.  A driver who, in response to highly 
stressful conditions, understandably drives carelessly is not provided an excuse 
because the driver must be found to have committed negligence in order for the 
insurer’s duty to indemnify to kick in. 
  The problem with this line of reasoning is obvious.  Many excuses have nothing 
to do with pressures or obstacles created by third parties or, more generally, with 
the possibility of indemnification.  In a case of trespass to land under conditions of 
necessity, there is no would-be indemnitor waiting in the wings.  The same is true 
for acts of carelessness committed in highly stressful situations that are not covered 
by a liability insurance policy.  Yet in neither case does tort law permit excuses. The 
trespasser and the negligent actor each is being held responsible in his own right, 
for what he has done to the plaintiff, not because he is available to serve as a pass-
through.   
 
C. Dissolving the Puzzle 
  As noted in the Introduction, one can try to side-step the problem of tort law’s 
insensitivity to excuses by denying that tort law really has anything to do with 
                                                      
101 JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT 217 (1924) (“Liability is the beginning of 
responsibility. We are held accountable by others for the consequences of our actions.”); 
STEPHEN  DARWALL,  THE  SECOND-PERSON  STANDPOINT:  MORALITY,  RESPECT AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY  3-10 (2006) (discussing the centrality to morality of the idea that other 
persons have authority to make demands on how one conducts oneself); P.F. Strawson, 
Freedom and Resentment, in FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT AND OTHER  ESSAYS 1, 6-7 
(Routledge 2008) (1962) (discussing the centrality of “reactive attitudes” to notions of moral 
responsibility). 
102 A criminal code that actually treated excuses as decision rules might also be morally 
suspect for withholding from citizens critical information as to their prospects for 
punishment. Dan-Cohen, supra note 96, at 665-77 (noting the potential illegitimacy of the 
selective transmission of legal rules).  Thanks to Don Herzog for emphasizing this concern. 28 
 
accountability for wrongs.  Indeed, a person so inclined could argue that, by 
emphasizing the ways in which tort law is indifferent to excuses, I have actually 
vindicated this maneuver.  After all, if one were looking for doctrinal evidence that 
tort law is not about wrongs in any robust sense, its lack of excuses would seem to fit 
the bill.  That tort liability attaches even to those who act under duress, or out of 
necessity, or in response to pressures that would lead persons of ordinary resilience 
to act carelessly, seems to demonstrate that it cannot be law that is concerned with 
wrongdoing, and must instead be aiming to accomplish something different.   
  Nor is this an objection that needs to be imagined. Richard Posner long ago 
argued that tort law cannot be understood to be a law of wrongs and responsibility, 
except in the most attenuated sense. In support of this claim, he cited the 
insensitivity of negligence law to claims of incapacity and excuses.103  Modern tort 
law is primarily about negligence, he reasoned, and negligence does not recognize 
excuses, which should tell us that legal fault is an altogether different beast from 
moral fault.  Further, it helps us to see that tort law is a scheme for incentivizing 
actors to take cost-efficient precautions against causing harm.   
  Theorists who aim to link tort law to notions of fairness sometimes make a 
similar move.  Jules Coleman and Stephen Perry, for example, has each suggested 
that tort law is best understood as implementing a principle of corrective justice 
according to which losses are to be transferred from those who, in fairness, shouldn’t 
have to bear them to those who should.104 Here again the distinctiveness of legal 
fault—and in particular its insensitivity to excuses—could be trotted out as a reason 
to favor an understanding of tort law according to which it aims to do something 
other than holding actors responsible for their wrongs. According to this kind of 
account, there is no mystery why an actor with a good excuse is nonetheless held 
fully liable for the consequences of his negligence. As between an innocent victim 
and a wrongful injurer, fairness calls for the loss to be borne by the injurer, even an 
injurer who has a good excuse. 
  For reasons discussed below, efforts to explain why torts are not ‘really’ wrongs 
are unmotivated. Regardless, they fail to make sense of tort doctrine. The 
interpretive challenges faced by efficient-deterrence theories having been well-
documented.105 Benjamin Zipursky and I have elsewhere pointed out comparable 
problems faced by loss-shifting theories, including their inability to account for torts 
that do not require losses, and their downplaying of the role that agency plays in 
                                                      
103 Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 31-32 (1970) (noting 
ways in which the objective standard of fault departs from notions of fault found in everyday 
morality). 
104 See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 34, at 222-24, 314-18, 330-32 (distinguishing tort from 
crime, and arguing that tort law is concerned with responsibility for losses); Stephen R. 
Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 497-500 (1992) (arguing 
that the objectivity of the fault standard is consistent with its serving as a criterion for 
distributing a loss among all persons outcome-responsible for the loss).     
105  See, e.g., JULES  L.  COLEMAN,  THE  PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN  DEFENSE OF A 
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 13-24 & n. 7 (2001) (critiquing efforts to explain 
tort law’s structure and basic features as a scheme of efficient deterrence and citing other, 
related critiques by Ernest Weinrib and Benjamin Zipursky); RONALD  DWORKIN,  LAW’S 
EMPIRE 23-29, 276-312 (1986) (critiquing positive economic theories of common law and tort 
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determining liability.106 In sum, these efforts to dissolve the puzzle of tort law’s 
inattention to excuses come at the cost of abandoning the aspiration for a compelling 
overall account of tort law’s main features. 
 
D. Excuses and Punishment 
One might suppose that excuses are not to be found in tort because excuses are 
uniquely relevant to particular forms of accountability for wrongdoing such as blame 
and punishment. Since—the argument would go—tort liability is not predicated on 
blame and is not punishment, it is no surprise that tort law fails to recognize 
excuses.     
Just below, I will offer a variant of this argument. Before doing so, however, I 
need to explain why this particular iteration of it is too crude. As a conceptual 
matter, there is nothing unique about blame or punishment suggesting that excuses 
are relevant only to these forms of accountability. Consider, again, the role of 
excuses in everyday life.  Often they are invoked to ward off complaints or criticisms, 
or to seek forgiveness, rather than as grounds for leniency in punishment. Indeed, 
they are routinely pleaded in connection with minor wrongs—e.g., arriving late for 
an appointment—that provide no grounds whatsoever for punishment. If excuses 
can defuse a criticism or complaint about humdrum failings, it is difficult to see why, 
in law, they can only operate to limit punishment.  Nothing inherent in the idea of 
an excuse prevents the law from recognizing excuses with respect to liability.  
As noted earlier,107 it may well be the case that excuses are particularly salient 
when accountability takes the form of punishment.  Even so, this would not explain 
why excuses have no role in tort. The same problem inheres in suggestions that 
excuses apply only with respect to the sort of culpable wrongs that merit retribution 
or vengeance. Excuses pertain to accountability for wrongs generally, not just the 
particular form of accountability that goes under the heading “punishment.”  The 
absence of excuses from tort law thus cannot be explained on the ground that 
excuses are, by their nature, irrelevant to accountability when it takes the form of 
liability. 
 
E.  The Distinctiveness of Tort  
  1.  Wrongs and Recourse.  As I noted at the outset, tort law directs us to 
refrain from attacking others even when we are provoked or under duress.  It also 
requires us to refrain from trespassing on or converting another’s property even in a 
situation of necessity.  And it insists that we be careful even when we face pressures 
that would induce persons of ordinary skill and resilience to be careless. Legal 
requirements that are this demanding—some scholars seem to suppose—cannot 
possibly be requirements that define wrongs, except perhaps in the vacuous sense of 
defining conduct that, when undertaken, leaves the actor vulnerable to adverse legal 
consequences.  Yet this last supposition is erroneous.108 
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Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 917, 953-71 (2010). 
107 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
108 Adherence to the fallacies described below provides perhaps the most common route to 
the conclusion that the puzzle of tort law’s lack of excuses should be dissolved rather than 
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  The error in the supposition is its insistence on an unjustifiably rigid or narrow 
conception of what can count as a wrong. The ideas of committing a wrong, and 
being held responsible for a wrong, can vary with context without collapsing into 
vacuity. It is a fallacy—call it the moralistic fallacy—to suppose that the essence of 
wrongdoing is a strong form of culpability or blameworthiness.109 To fall prey to this 
fallacy is to treat all wrongdoing as a species of sin; as a transgression that leaves a 
stain on the wrongdoer’s soul and warrants strong condemnation. Similarly, it is a 
fallacy—call it the ought-implies-can fallacy—to suppose that there is a unitary 
principle that forbids us from identifying conduct as “wrongful” whenever the 
putative wrongdoer lacks a certain degree of control over whether her conduct will 
amount to the commission of a wrong.   
  Concepts of moral and legal wrongdoing exist along a spectrum. To label conduct 
as “wrongful” for purposes of criminal law means one thing. To label conduct as 
“wrongful” for purposes of tort law means another.  Criminal wrongdoing comes with 
certain capacity-and-control conditions. Tortious wrongdoing comes with other, less 
demanding conditions.110 To commit a criminal wrong warrants a certain kind of 
response. To commit a tortious wrong warrants a different kind of response.  This is 
why, in the end, it is perfectly plausible for tort law to decline to recognize excuses, 
even though criminal law does.   
  To be clear , my claim is not that there a complete conceptual misfit between 
excuses and tort liability: I criticize that claim above. Still, the instinct to draw some 
distinctions among crimes, torts, and other kinds of wrongs is sound.  The trick is to 
give it a more satisfactory expression.  There is nothing about the nature of excuses 
that would render them an unintelligible feature of tort law. Yet, given the 
distinctive nature of tortious wrongdoing, courts have good reason not to recognize 
excuses in tort. 
  The distinctiveness of tortious wrongdoing starts with the structure of tort 
duties. The duties of conduct identified by the law through its specification of 
particular torts are duties of non-injury, rather than duties of non-injuriousness.111 
One cannot breach a tort duty until one has injured someone. For example, the 
wrong of negligence, as defined by tort law, is not committed by acting carelessly.  It 
is committed by injuring someone through careless conduct. This is why there can be 
inchoate crimes but not inchoate torts.112 Until there is a victim, there is no tort.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
two fallacies described below, and indeed has helped to expose them.  Yet he might also 
argue that the absence of excuses in tort can be explained on the ground that tort law is, in 
the end, best understood as a law for the fair allocation of losses, rather than law that stands 
ready to hold wrongdoers responsible to their victims.  See supra note 99 and accompanying 
text. 
109 I assume for present purposes that blameworthy acts are particularly culpable.  For a 
broader and less freighted account of what it means to blame, see T.M. SCANLON, MORAL 
DIMENSIONS 122-138 (2008) (arguing that for X to blame Y is for X to regard an action of Y’s 
as demonstrating an attitude or disposition toward X that is incompatible with the terms of 
their relationship, and, on that basis, for X to revise negatively his attitude toward Y). 
110 John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1123, 1143-63 (2007) 
111 Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Corrective Justice in an Age of Mass Torts, 
in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 219 (G. Postema, ed. 2001). 
112 John C. P. Goldberg & Benajmin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625, 
1636-41 (2002). 31 
 
While different courts have held different views of what can count as an injury, and 
some have pushed the idea of injury quite far,113 they have rarely if ever suggested 
that there is such a thing as a victimless tort.  
  In fact, tort liability requires more than a wrongdoer, a wrong, and a victim.  
Tort law further requires a wrong to the victim.  Conduct that is merely anti-social, 
or wrongful toward someone other than the person injured, is not tortious. As 
Benjamin Zipursky first demonstrated, all torts—whether trespass, fraud, 
defamation and negligence—have this “substantive standing” requirement.114 One 
who is not herself trespassed against, defrauded, defamed, or injured by 
carelessness as to her has no tort claim, even if the defendant has acted wrongfully 
toward others and caused injury to the victim in an entirely foreseeable way. 
  Relatedly, tort law assigns a particular role to the state. Unlike in criminal law, 
the government does not prosecute on behalf of the public.  Rather, it stands ready 
to assist the victim in the pursuit of her claim.  In criminal law, the case caption 
reads “People (or Government) v. Defendant.”  In tort, it reads “Victim (or Victim’s 
representative) v. Defendant.” It is no coincidence that torts are wrongs with 
victims, and that tort suits are brought by victims. Tort law is largely about victims’ 
rights—the right of potential victims not to be injured, and the right of actual 
victims to respond to having been injured.   
  Finally, the aim of tort suits is to enable a wrongfully injured victim to obtain a 
form of satisfaction as against the wrongdoer.  This is why the end result of a tort 
suit, typically, is an award of compensatory damages or injunctive relief. Tort law 
empowers victims to demand something tangible from tortfeasors by way of redress 
for the injurious wrong done to them. This is why the measure of tort compensation 
is keyed to the victim’s losses, and in turn why many defendants’ complaints of being 
made to pay compensation ‘out of proportion’ to the gravity of their wrong fall on 
deaf ears.  Here too tort law’s attention to the interests of victims relative to the 
interests of wrongdoers is evident.   
  In sum, although they both concern wrongs, criminal law is one kind of system of 
accountability for wrongs and tort law is another. Because criminal prosecutions are 
brought by a powerful state that operates the system through which accountability 
occurs, and because the point of such prosecutions is to inflict punishment on behalf 
of the public, criminal law builds in various protections for defendants. These 
include heightened evidentiary burdens for the prosecution, greater efforts to ensure 
adequate notice to potential defendants, and a general norm of construing legal 
ambiguities against the state. They also include the recognition of excuses both with 
respect to guilt and punishment.115 
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for survival to constitute an injury to the patient.  See, e.g., Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 
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114 Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. 
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  In tort law, by contrast, the interests of the putative injurer and the putative 
victim are delineated in a more evenhanded way, and it is the reciprocally situated 
putative victim who proceeds against the putative injurer, not the state.  Once the 
rights and duties of each have been delineated through the definition of particular 
torts, a victim who is able to establish that her right has been violated by the 
defendant is ipso facto able to establish that the defendant breached a duty to her, 
i.e., wronged her.  And because tort law is in the business of empowering those who 
are wronged in this sense, rather than punishing those who commit crimes, the 
demands placed on plaintiffs are, on the whole, less onerous than those placed on 
criminal prosecutors.116 Likewise, there is less emphasis on the wrongdoer’s 
culpability and control: liability can be keyed to outcomes even granted that 
tortfeasors lack a substantial degree of control over those outcomes.117 And conduct 
can count as tortious that is not criminal nor blameworthy in a strong sense.  Just as 
tort law is entitled to require clumsy persons to live up to the standard of a person 
capable of ordinary prudence, it is entitled to define wrongs in a manner that is 
inattentive to excuses. In response to a wrongful injurer’s proffered excuse, a tort 
victim is, in effect, authorized to say: “I really don’t want to hear about it. I 
understand that you might have a good explanation of why you did what you did.  
But that doesn’t matter to me.  You still wrongfully injured me, and I am now 
entitled to hold you to account.” The innocent victim of an attack perpetrated by an 
attacker acting under duress has still been victimized. So too has the victim of a 
trespass undertaken by necessity, or an act of negligence committed under 
circumstances in which one could not have expected even a resilient person to act 
carefully.          
  This last observation points to a related dimension of tort that further explains 
its indifference to excuses. Excuses in criminal law allow defendants to make 
arguments against liability that are directed to a judge or jury. A criminal 
defendant’s duress defense, for example, is an argument that asks a judge or a jury 
                                                      
116 Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 110, at 1123, 1143-63.  This is not to deny that many 
tort claimants face formidable barriers to prevailing as a result of bearing the burden of 
proving that a tort has been committed. Indeed, one might cite the difficulty of prevailing as 
a reason that favors tort law’s reliance on standards of conduct that are in certain respects 
relatively demanding. 
117 This is why the now-familiar “moral luck” objection to tort law is misguided. Jeremy 
Waldron and Christopher Schroeder, among others, have condemned tort as morally 
arbitrary because of the role it gives to causal fortuities.  Driver A drives carelessly but, 
through sheer good luck, hits no one; Driver B drives identically and, through sheer bad luck, 
hits someone. Liability, they insist, cannot fairly be imposed only on B, for B and A have 
committed the same wrong—careless driving.  Id. at 1125-26 (quoting from Jeremy Waldron, 
Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 
387, 387-88 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); Christopher H. Schroeder, Causation, Compensation, 
and Moral Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra, at 347, 361).  
This criticism simply misses the point. Tort law is not a matter of the state imposing liability 
on anti-social conduct, nor is it matter of seeing to it that wrongdoers get their just deserts, 
whatever those might be. It is law that empowers victims to respond to having been 
wrongfully injured. For this s o r t  o f  s c h e m e  t o  i n s i s t  o n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  a  v i c t i m  i s  n o t  
arbitrary. It is the very point of the enterprise.  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 110, at 
1132-43.  Moreover, there is plenty of reason to think that the enterprise is one that both 
embodies values central to Anglo-American law (individual rights, status equality, etc.) and 
that stands to deliver various goods (norm-reinforcement, compensation, deterrence, etc.).    33 
 
to relieve her of liability because of the pressures she faced at the time she 
committed the crime.  By not recognizing excuses, tort law transfers this power to 
the victim. In tort, pleas of excuse overwhelmingly can only be directed to the victim 
herself.118 In other words, tort law provides a framework of accountability for wrongs 
that grants to victims of those wrongs—rather than chief executives, prosecutors, 
judges, or jurors—the power to excuse. It is no coincidence that the same legal 
system that declines to recognize excuses in tort law denies to the chief executive the 
power to intervene in tort and other litigation over private wrongs.119  
 
 2.  Redress for Wrongs, Not Compensation for Losses. It would be 
understandable if one were to see in the foregoing analysis an endorsement of a 
conception of tort that gives priority to victims and victim compensation. After all, I 
have not only emphasized unforgiving aspects of tort duties, I have connected these 
features of tort duties to a notion of victim empowerment. And it is not a huge leap 
to move from a focus on victim empowerment to a focus on victim compensation, 
which in turn invites thoughts of workers’ compensation schemes, or the fund set up 
by Congress to compensate certain victims of 9/11.  In these tort-replacement 
schemes there is little or no attention to wrongdoing. The point is to get money to 
people who need or deserve it. Liability (if that is even the right word) is “strict,” 
meaning that the payment of ‘compensation’ is divorced from notions of wrongdoing.   
  In fact, the foregoing analysis is not part of an effort to depict tort law as skewed 
toward victims, or as a compensation scheme that is indifferent to wrongdoing. Torts 
are wrongs. Until someone has acted in a manner proscribed by tort law—until 
someone has assaulted another, defamed another, invaded another’s privacy, or 
injured them through carelessness, for example—there is no ground for liability. 
And, although compensation is the standard tort remedy, compensation, in this 
                                                      
118 There is some evidence suggesting that at least some tort plaintiffs are willing to be 
lenient or temperate toward tortfeasors whose wrongs are more understandable than others.  
See  Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 284-85 (2001).  With respect to the medical malpractice claims he 
studied, Baker found that most plaintiffs were content to accept a settlement at the limits of 
the physician’s malpractice insurance, even when they might have been able to get more 
from a jury.  Obviously there is a lot that goes into the dynamics of settlement, including the 
critical and potentially problematic role played by plaintiffs’ lawyers in ‘managing’ client 
expectations.  Id. at 283. But the outcomes Baker observed may in part have been a matter of 
plaintiff leniency—a recognition that, though medical mistakes are often wrongs, they are 
also often understandable wrongs. The important point is that, insofar as torts are 
understandable wrongs, they are not excused by operation of law.  Rather, they are excusable 
by the victim. 
119 Power of the President to Remit Fines Against Defaulting Jurors, 4 U.S. Op. Att’y 
Gen. 458, 460 (1845) (upholding the President’s power to pardon a court-imposed fine on 
defaulting jurors, but noting that this power, like the English monarch’s, is confined to 
penalties for offenses against the public, and does not extend to remedies for private wrongs); 
The Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 482, 491 (1831) (contrasting the 
President’s power to control federal criminal prosecutions with his lack of power to intervene 
in civil proceedings); John C. P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due 
Process and the Right to a Law of Redress for Wrongs, 115 YALE L. J. 539-41, 543-44 (2005) 
(noting the British common law constitutionalist tradition of denying the monarch the power 
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context, refers to the payment of money as “damages”—as a form of satisfaction or 
vindication, not as the paying out of a benefit.120   
  The point, once again, is that tort law cogently deploys a distinctive and in some 
ways capacious conception of wrongdoing.121 Injuring another through carelessness 
that one could not have avoided sometimes will count as negligence. More 
dramatically, perhaps, injuring another through the sale of a product that happens 
to contain a dangerous defect, irrespective of whether the seller could have caught 
the defect, will sometimes count as a tort.  Often liability imposed on these terms is 
described as “strict.” But this description trades on an ambiguity in the phrase 
“strict liability.” Many forms of so-called “strict” liability are wrongs-based.  
  If a defective product injures a user in the ordinary course, and the defect was 
present in the product at the time of sale, the seller has wrongfully injured the 
victim, and not merely in the vacuous sense of having done whatever the law 
requires for liability to attach.  There is a genuine failure or ‘defect’ in the seller’s 
conduct, namely, the sale of a product containing a danger that it should not 
contain.  This is something which, according to tort law, is not to be done.  The 
sending into the world of a dangerously defective product is the kernel of 
wrongdoing within even strict forms of products liability.   
  Of course it is difficult if not impossible for a commercial seller to comply 
perfectly with the legal directive that prohibits the sale of a defective product.  Luck 
has a significant role to play, and denials, justifications, and excuses are hard to 
come by.  Thus, even a seller who can prove that it exercised extraordinary care to 
avoid selling a defective product can be deemed to have done wrong if it sells such a 
product and if that product injures someone in the ordinary course.  But this is just 
to say that the directive contained within modern products liability law is a 
demanding directive, and that the wrong of injuring someone through the sale of a 
defective product is sometimes minimally culpable.  
  One can easily imagine a different form of strict products liability that is fully 
detached from wrongdoing.  Suppose a person who, despite being careful, trips over 
a nondefective tennis ball and breaks his ankle. If products liability doctrine 
permitted this person to recover from the seller of the tennis ball simply on the 
ground that the ball played a role in his being injured, then liability would no longer 
be wrongs-based in any meaningful sense. From the get-go, however, advocates of 
strict products liability have insisted that it not extend this far, and instead that it 
be limited to products that are sold in a defective condition.122         
  Tort law’s imposition of defect-based liability is of a piece with its reliance on an 
objective fault standard, its refusal to countenance necessity as a justification for 
trespass, and its indifference to excuses. Seeing the link among these doctrines can 
in turn shed some light on the longstanding obsession among torts scholars with the 
                                                      
120 John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Convergence and Contrast in Tort 
Scholarship: An Essay in Honor of Robert Rabin, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 487-90 (2012). 
121  In other ways—for example, through its adoption of relatively narrow affirmative 
duties to take steps to protect others from injury—tort notions of wrongdoing are less 
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question of negligence versus strict liability. Forty years ago, Morton Horwitz helped 
set off an academic firestorm by arguing that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
courts routinely imposed strict liability for accidentally caused harms, whereas 
nineteenth-century courts introduced fault-based liability as a means of limiting 
liability and “subsidizing” nascent industry.123 His argument was incendiary in part 
because it connected to the then-prevalent view that the pressing policy question for 
modern tort law is the question of whether accidents should be governed by a rule of 
negligence or strict liability.  My suggestion is that, notwithstanding all the 
attention it has received as a matter of history, doctrine, and theory, this supposedly 
stark dichotomy has been overblown, and that attention to the absence of excuses in 
tort can help us to see why.   
  In tort, the divide between strict liability and fault is subtle, not stark.  It is 
subtle precisely because the tort notion of fault is demanding. Negligence law 
requires us to meet the standard of care of a person of ordinary prudence—a 
standard that makes few allowances for mitigating factors, and that has little if any 
room for excuses. Thus, when a repeat-player tort defendant, such as a product 
manufacturer, complains about the unfairness of being held ‘strictly’ liability, that 
complaint should be met with caution. The reason for caution is not, as Horwitz 
suggested, because there is a long common law tradition of imposing tort liability 
irrespective of wrongdoing. Rather, it is because there is a long tradition of imposing 
tort liability without regard to the sort of excuses that, in other settings, suffice to 
exculpate careless injurings and other wrongs.   
   
F.  Excuses, Mercy and Forgiveness 
  The provision to tort plaintiffs of the power to excuse naturally invites 
consideration of concepts such as compassion, mercy, and forgiveness.  It may thus 
be illuminating to situate that power in relation to two influential accounts of those 
concepts.  
  Jeffrie Murphy has famously distinguished mercy from forgiveness on two 
grounds.  Mercy, he argues, can be bestowed by a non-victim (e.g., a prosecutor or 
judge) whereas only victims have standing to forgive. Moreover, forgiveness involves 
the reshaping of one’s attitude toward a wrongdoer—the foregoing of warranted 
resentment—and is thus compatible with refusing to be merciful in terms of the 
consequences to be visited on the wrongdoer.124  
  Relative to Murphy’s categories, a tort defendant’s offering of excuse-like 
considerations is a hybrid.  It is a plea for leniency directed to the victim, who alone 
has standing to decide whether to heed the plea. In the respect, it is akin to 
Murphy’s notion of forgiveness. And yet the victim probably can heed such a plea 
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without thereby abandoning her resentment, and in that respect resembles his 
notion of mercy.  
  Excuses likewise operate in the tort context on terms that cut across George 
Fletcher’s distinction between mercy and compassion.  Mercy, he argues, is granted 
by someone who holds power over another, and is based on an assessment that the 
other is of generally good character and therefore deserving of leniency.125 According 
to Fletcher, mercy is given institutional expression in criminal law in the discretion 
that certain actors within the system can deploy to spare a criminal defendant or 
mitigate his punishment, such as a prosecutorial decision not to charge or an 
executive’s pardon.126 By contrast, he maintains that compassion is rooted in a 
recognition of shared human frailty, and responds to particular acts rather than to 
the character of the wrongdoer.127 It counsels that we not be too quick to sit in 
judgment over an actor whose wrongful act is one that we, too, might have 
committed under the circumstances that the actor faced. Compassion (again, 
according to Fletcher) thus receives its expression in criminal law through the 
identification of particular excuses that do not depend on a decisionmaker’s 
discretion and instead earn the defendant acquittal as a matter of right.128 
  In a tort case, excuses bear some connection to mercy, as Fletcher uses that term.  
Tort law’s failure to give excuses any formal recognition leaves the choice to excuse 
in the hands of the plaintiff, who, by prevailing on her claim, has secured a legal 
power over the tortfeasor.  Yet I see no reason to suppose, as does Fletcher, that 
mercy of this sort can only be granted by reference to assessment of the tortfeasor’s 
character, as opposed to her tortious conduct. (Perhaps the plaintiff knows nothing 
of the defendant’s character yet still concludes that the defendant’s tort was 
committed under circumstances that render it understandable.) Nor, contra 
Fletcher, must mercy of this sort be divorced from an egalitarian notion of shared 
human frailty, as opposed to the idea of a superior granting an indulgence to an 
inferior.  Indeed, it might be just such an egalitarian notion that moves a tort 
plaintiff to show some leniency toward the defendant.     
  To summarize: tort law has basic features that hang together. It is not mere 
happenstance that torts are defined as injury-inclusive, relational wrongs, or that 
tort law empowers victims to respond to having been injuriously wronged, or that 
successful tort plaintiffs are ordinarily entitled to compensation keyed to their losses 
rather than to the wrongdoer’s culpability. It is also not mere happenstance that 
wrongdoing in tort is defined in ways that are, in certain respects, relatively 
demanding. Tort law’s general indifference to excuses is part and parcel of its being 
a law of injurious wrongs and victim redress.  It would be an overstatement to assert 
that courts would be abandoning tort law were they to start to recognize certain 
excuses. But it would be accurate to say that their doing runs counter to its general 
orientation.  At a minimum, tort law’s inattention to excuses is entirely defensible.129 
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G.  A Note on Excuses in Contract 
  It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide an in-depth analysis of the role of 
excuses in contract law. Nonetheless, it is important to at least gesture at some 
thoughts on that subject. After all, my account of the different treatment of excuses 
in criminal and tort law turns in large part on distinctions between public law and 
private law. It is because torts are relational wrongs—wrongs to particular 
persons—and because they generate private rights of action that excuses are out of 
place in tort. But of course contract law is private law too.  Thus, if contract law 
were to recognize excuses, I would have some explaining to do as to why, given the 
many commonalities between contract and tort, tort law does not recognize excuses.   
  The most commonly identified candidates for excuses in contract law include 
mistake, impossibility, impracticability, and frustration of purpose. A defendant who 
invokes one of these doctrines could be characterized as conceding that he has 
committed a legal wrong by not performing as required under the contract, yet 
seeking to excuse the wrong by identifying unusual circumstances that render the 
breach understandable.   
  For present purposes it will suffice to say that this characterization is 
tendentious at a minimum, and probably incorrect.  A fundamental norm of contract 
law is that agreements are to be kept.130 The notion is one of liability in accordance 
with the terms of the agreement, irrespective of the difficulty of meeting those 
terms.131 The law’s presumption is that, since contractual obligations ordinarily are 
negotiated and voluntarily assumed, qualifications to performance obligations can be 
built into the agreement.  If one does not wish to guarantee performance, one can 
instead agree to make reasonable or best efforts to perform.132 Contracting parties 
are thus ordinarily not allowed to escape their obligations by pointing to some 
unexpected difficulty that renders performance more difficult, even if it is of a sort 
that renders their nonperformance understandable in the requisite sense. 
  And yet contract law occasionally does provide for just such an escape.  However, 
when it does, it does not do so by recognizing excuses for breach. Instead it 
recognizes certain implicit conditions built into the parties’ obligations. To put the 
point in the language of Part I, invocations of ‘excuse’ doctrines in contract are best 
understood as denials rather than genuine excuses.  
  For example, when a contracting party invokes impossibility or impracticability, 
she argues that the contract implicitly conditioned her performance on its not being 
rendered impossible or impracticable by certain subsequent events. Given this 
condition, there is no breach that needs to be excused—the nonperforming party 
never incurred a duty to perform under those circumstances.133 Indicative of the fact 
that doctrines such as impossibility and impracticability concern qualifications to 
contractual duties rather than excuses for breaches of those duties is the fact that 
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these doctrines set defaults that can be overridden (or expanded upon) by explicit 
contractual terms.134 Likewise, there is no need to invoke excuses to explain the 
absence of liability for nonperformance of an agreement that reflects a fundamental 
misunderstanding—a non-meeting of the minds. In such a case, the parties simply 
failed to obligate themselves.135  
  Admittedly, some courts and commentators have questioned whether doctrines 
such as impossibility and impracticability can fairly be characterized as conditions 
on contractual obligations, given that these conditions are typically implied rather 
than express. If it is courts that are imposing these limits on contractual duties, how 
can these be genuine contractual terms, as opposed to after-the-fact recognitions of 
excuses for non-performance? Yet, as Curtis Bridgeman has observed, the 
identification of implicit conditions in contracts by no means collapses into the 
recognition of after-the-fact exemptions: 
even if parties never expressly addressed possible events [that render 
performance impossible or impracticable], the court is justified in ascribing 
intentions to the parties for such cases based on the relevant norms and 
practices of the community. Meanings are not a purely individual matter. 
Just as a party is not entitled to keep an intention private and then claim 
protection based on that intention later, so too the parties’ mutual agreement 
will be interpreted in light of relevant customs, norms, and practices both of 
the parties and of the community.136       
A court charged with the task of interpreting a contract can fairly infer from its 
terms that the parties agreed to those terms in light of certain background 
assumptions as to what would remain constant over the life of the contract, even 
when those assumptions are not identified explicitly in the contract.  When courts do 
so, they are not granting excuses.  They are enforcing the agreement into which the 
parties entered.  
  Obviously this brief excursus cannot substitute for a full analysis of the role of 
excuses in contract law.  It aims instead to forestall a facial objection to my analysis 
of tort law.  As noted above, that objection runs as follows: if I am correct about the 
reasons for the absence of excuses in tort, one should not expect to find excuses in 
contract law, yet excuses can be found there. I have suggested a line of defense 
against this objection by pointing toward a plausible (and indeed mainstream) 
account of contract doctrine according to which the contract doctrines that appear to 
harbor excuses in fact do not.        
 
Conclusion 
  In contrast to criminal law, tort law does not recognize excuses as a ground on 
which judge or jury might spare a defendant from liability or limit her liability.  In 
this respect, as in several others, tort law sets demanding standards—standards 
that, on some occasions, ask more of us than we can be expected to deliver.   
  Some have suggested that the unforgiving aspects of tort law entail that it is a 
law of wrongs in name only. I have sought to explain why this inference is mistaken. 
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The absence of formal excuses in tort does not demonstrate that torts somehow fail 
to count as wrongs. It demonstrates instead they are a certain kind of wrong—
namely, violations of legal directives that specify ways in which we are required to 
conduct ourselves toward others so as to avoid injuring those others.137 It is entirely 
cogent, not mere wordplay, to describe violations of these sorts of directives as 
“wrongs.”  In this particular sense, torts really are inexcusable wrongs. 
  Understanding the sense in which torts are inexcusable helps us to appreciate 
further how some of tort law’s most notable features—the objective fault standard in 
negligence, the relative indifference throughout tort law toward problems of moral 
luck, and the linkage of wrongs to rights of action—hang together to form a coherent 
body of law.  It can also teach us something about wrongs more generally, whether 
legal or moral.  Simply put, it is a mistake to associate the idea of wrongs with 
vengeance, with punishment, and with fire and brimstone. A wrong, at its most 
basic, is simply a failure to heed a directive that specifies how one is obligated to 
conduct oneself in light of certain interests of others. To be sure, some wrongs are 
heinous and warrant outrage. But many are mundane and instead warrant 
responses ranging from expressions of disappointment to liability.   
  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was wrong about wrongs, and wrong about torts, 
when he linked the common law’s traditional focus on wrongdoing to primitive 
notions of vengeance and blame, and thereby dismissed the idea that modern tort 
law could be a law of wrongs, as opposed to law that distributes losses on terms 
consistent with basic principles of liberalism, as he understood them.138 
Contemporary commentators are likewise off-base in supposing that tort law is the 
worst of both worlds: a clumsy mechanism for deterring misconduct, and for 
compensating the injured, that relies on judgmental moralism in place of rational 
policymaking. Tort law is not a law of vengeance.  Nor is it a regulatory mechanism. 
It specifies wrongs and provides private rights of action to victims, thereby enabling 
us to hold each other accountable for injuries that we wrongfully inflict on one 
another. 
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